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EASTERN EDUCATION JOURNAL

TARBLE ARTS CENTER
One of the newest additions to the campus of
Eastern Illinois University is the Tarble Arts Center
located on 7th Street, south of the Buzzard Education
Building.
Opened in June of 1982, the TAC is the realization of
the late Newton Tarble, who attended Eastern from
1905 to 1909 and was the co-founder of Snap-On Tool
Company. Tarble donated one million dollars to fund
the project.
According to Don Carmichael, Director of the TAC,
one of the main purposes of the center is to generate
educational programs in the forms of art, theater, and
music.
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The TAC has 11 galleries, a multi-purpose area for
lectures and movies, and an ampitheater for concerts
and plays. The TAC maintains major travelling exhibits
four to six weeks in addition to its permanent exhibits.
In the near future, the TAC will provide "Arts on
Wheels", bringing the arts to people of east central
Illinois. The traveling exhibit will visit public schools
and city parks, giving people a chance to sample the
TAC. The TAC also offers workshops and non-credit
courses in the arts.
Designed by E. Verner Johnson of Boston, the Tarble
Arts Center is a very different and striking building on
Eastern's campus-a structure of and for the arts.
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EASTERN EDUCATION JOURNAL

The Eastern Education Journal seeks to present
competent discussions of contemporary issues in
education and toward this end generally publishes
articles written by persons active in the profession of
education who have developed degrees of expertise
through preparation and experience in the field .
We are currently soliciting articles . All varieties of
manuscript will be accepted. Research summaries,
program descriptions, and book reviews are considered
worthy; the Editorial Board, however, will give priority
to original points of view and strong personal position
papers . Controversy is welcome, and the editors hope
to present a balance of pro and con articles on current
issues in education. Manuscripts must be submitted to
the Editor, Ronald Leathers, School of Education,
Eastern Illinois University.
1. Manuscript size should be limited to 3000 words
less. It should be typed, double spaced, on 8½ by
paper. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum, and
references must appear at the end of the article
format according to the APA publication manual.
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2. The original and three legible copies are required;
articles accepted for publication are read and approved
by a minimum of three members of the Editorial Board.
3. Each manuscript submitted should be accompanied
by an identification cover sheet containing the following
current information about each author:

PUBLISHED BY
THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

Stan Rives, Acting President
Margaret Soderberg, Acting Vice President
for Academic Affairs

Ronald Leathers, Editor

Editorial Board
Kathlene Shank; Professor,
Special Education
Robert Barger; Associate
Professor, Secondary Education
and Foundations

a. Name and official title
b. Institutional affiliation
c. Address, including zip code
d. A statement whether or not the article has been
previously published or is under consideration by
another publication.
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Charles Joley, Dean
School of Education

FROM THE EDITOR.

• •

We are pleased to feature another of our "special topics
issues." Guest Editor, Kenneth Sutton, has assembled a
group of four scholars with expertise in applied philosophy
who present a thorough discussion - debate, both
theoretical and practical, regarding the question of values
imposition. Most careers in education are characterized by
what the practitioner does relative to the question.
When students or staff members are being evaluated, the
person doing the evaluation may raise a private question:
"Do I really have a right to do this?" When a teacher,
counselor, or administrator is conducting a group discussion there is often a need to decide whether to let it proceed
freely or to limit what can happen. Assignments one gives

can be more or less open to student, client, or staff member
initiative. Rules a teacher, counselor, or administrator may
establish can be more or less numerous, more or less
definite, and more or less strictly enforced.
In a unique format, each author provides an original
position statement regarding values imposition in the
schoolhouse in terms of a traditional social ideology. In the
final section, each author, in a separate article, critiques the
essays written by the other three authors.
The approach is interesting, and we trust that it will be
stimulating to theorists and practitioners. Guest Editor
Kenneth Sutton provides additional background for the idea
in his introductory article.

Acknowledgements . ..
For particulars in the following announcements regarding events at Eastern, the Editor is
indebted to Audrey Du men tat and staff writers on the Eastern Daily News and to Harry Read and
Charles Titus in the Offices of Information and Publications and Alumni Services .

Charles Joley Appointed Dean, School of Education

Dr. Charles L. Joley came to
Eastern Illinois University in 1970
as the University Liaison Officer to
the Illinois Office of Education in
the Department of Adult, Vocational, and Technical Education.
Shortly thereafter, he became the
Coordinator of Field Services in
the Center for Educational Studies
to provide service to area public
schools, and later added the post
DR. CHARLES L. JOLEY
of Director of Occupational Education to his record. On November 1,
1982, Dr. Joley became the new Dean for the School of
Education.
Dr. Joley began his educational career in 1957 as a
vocational teacher; he later became Superintendent of
Schools for the Cullom Elementary and High School
Districts for 1961-1962 and the Oakland Community Unit
District from 1962-1968. After serving as the Director for
Administrative Services in the Eastern Illinois Development
and Service Unit from 1968-1970, Dr. Joley came to

Eastern, completing his doctorate in Educational Administration at the University of Illinois that same year.
The new dean said that after 18 years of administrative
positions, he believes that one of his greatest assets is his
ability to manage resources, both human and financial. "I
think I can knock down barriers to help people become as
productive as possible." Dr. Joley added that he also has a
knack for taking "theories or a series of ideas and applying
them in such a way that they do more than float in the air."
As an administrator, Dr. Joley was responsible for the
development and implementation of degrees in Career
Occupations at Eastern, and through his efforts, the degree
program became the only one of its type to be approved by
the State Teacher Certification Board.
A member and consultant to numerous educational
councils and organizations and an author of professional
journal articles, Dr. Joley is also a member of several state
and national professional associations. He has been
honored with many awards during his career, such as the
Outstanding Educator in Higher Education in 1974 and 1975
and the Meritorious Service to Vocational Education Award
for five consecutive years from 1973-1977. Dr. Joley was
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also one of four educators selected nationally to represent
the United States in the Polish-American Scholars
Exchange Program in 1977.
Dr. Joley said he has several points of focus as the new
Dean in the School of Education.
"I want to get across the social significance of teaching to
communities; I would also like to see teaching regain the
position of a valued profession, so we can continue to
attract able, capable people into the profession." The dean
said that the future will definitely see a teaching shortage,
and there will be a continuing demand for graduates in
education .
Dr. Joley continued his points of focus by stating a need
for a cooperative program with area public schools and a

need for some type of support program for first year
graduates, as well. He mentioned that ties between the
University and the State Board of Education should be
strengthened and added, "I would also like to see a coming
together of the various departments in Education in a
cooperative activity, perhaps in some type of generic
Education program."
Dr. Jomy said that along with Associate Dean George
Schlinsog and Ronald Leathers, Assistant to the Dean,
there is a "terrific foundation" for a very capable
administrative team. And with help from faculty members,
the school will be able to reach a consensus of the important
issues that must be faced by the School of Education.

Daniel E. Marvin Resigns EIU Presidency

On March 17, Daniel E. Marvin,
Jr. sent a campus-wide communication to "colleagues and
friends." In part, the letter read:
"Later this afternoon I will announce my resignation as President of Eastern Illinois University
effective July 1, 1983. This has
been one of the hardest decisions
of my life, because I am extremely
proud of this University, its many
fine accomplishments, the quality
DR. DANIELE. MARVIN
of its academic programs, and
most of all the warmth and dedication of its faculty, staff,
and students.
"I am proud of my own work here . . . I believe we are
better and more efficiently managed and have a greater
impact on our primary service regions . .. It would not have
been possible to accomplish these tasks without your effort
and cooperation ."
"Because my family and I will continue to be in this area,
we will be fortunate to keep many friends . For this we are
thankful."
Marvin will become President and Chief Executive Officer
of the First National Bank of Mattoon and its parent holding
company, First Mid-Illinois Bancshares, Inc. He has served
on the bank's Board of Directors since 1980.
Marvin came to Eastern in February, 1977 as the fifth
president. He had previously served as the Director of the
State Council of Higher Education for the state of Virginia .
Eastern, Marvin said, "is the finest regional university in
the state of Illinois, if not the entire midwest." He credited
each of the four preceding presidents with establishing "a
foundation upon which the next president could continue to
build."
During his six years as Eastern's president, Daniel E.
Marvin always placed great emphasis on academics, an
Eastern administrator said following Marvin's resignation.
"In his language, that's what we're (Eastern) .all about,"
Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs Stanley
Rives said .
4

In addition, Rives cited Marvin's ability to manage
Eastern' s resources as one of the major contributions of his
administration.
Because Eastern has been underfunded in recent years
compared to other universities, Marvin has had to handle
the available funds with extreme care in order to maintain
quality, Rives added.
Marvin's skills in managing university funds were recently
put to the test with the implementation of a state-required
2-percent budget cut, as well as the formulation of
contingency budget plans to help meet possible budget cuts
in Fiscal Year 1984.
Rives also said Marvin established a good working
relationship with members of the university community,
including "open communication lines with students,
faculty, and staff."
He was always willing to consider how other people might
feel in their respective positions, Rives added.
Other highlights of Marvin's six year administration
include:
• Marvin's approval of a $9 student athletic fee hike in
January, 1981 which stipulated that women's and men's
athletics would receive $8 per student per semester and the
cheerleaders, pep band. marching band, and Pink Panthers
would receive the remaining $1 per student per semester.
• Marvin's two trips to Poland as part of a monitoring and
evaluation committee to determine if the United States is
ready to begin more exchange efforts between Polish and
American educational institutions.
• His trips to Korea, Taiwan, and China in the summer of
1981 to establish a working relationship for future faculty
and student exchange between Eastern and universities in
those countries.
• His return to the classroom to teach Zoology 2999
"Human Physiology" during fall semester 1981.
Marvin, 45, took the post of Eastern president in
February, 1977 after former Eastern President, Gilbert C.
Fite, resigned to assume the Richard 8. Russell Professorship of History at the University of Georgia.

Rives Appointed Acting President

Dr. Stan Rives, Eastern's provost and vice president for academic affairs,- assumed the duties
of acting president July 1 and will
serve until the Board of Governors
appoints a president. Before coming to Eastern, Rives was associate
provost and dean of undergraduate instruction at Illinois State
University in Normal. He has been
Eastern's vice president for academic affairs since January 1981
DR . STAN RIVES
and provost since last January.
Rives' experience as an administrator at both Illinois State
and Eastern has given him experience in the daily operations
of a university. This experience should serve him well in the
position of acting president.
Since his appointment to the office of vice president of
academic affairs, Rives has been instrumental in initiating
and administering several new programs. One of his
primary objectives as vice president of academic affairs was
to maintain high academic standards by establishing an
honors program for academically talented students.
Rives met his objective by establishing Eastern's honors
program which is designed to be more challenging for above
average students of freshman or sophomore standing.

Another program that Rives helped establish is the
five-year academic plan program, a continuous planning
process involving·· all academic schools, departments,
and/or units.
Rives will be EIU's chief officer until mid-fall, when the
Board of Governors picks a replacement for former
President Daniel E. Marvin Jr. Rives, who came to EIU as
vice-president for academic affairs in 1981, is one of the
candidates for that job. He and his wife Sandy have two
children, University of Illinois Asian Studies graduate
student, Jacqueline, and Charleston High School student
Joseph.
Appointment of faculty and staff members to a steering
committee for preparation of the institutional self-study
required for re-accreditation by the North Central Association (NCA) was Rives' first official act.
The NCA accreditation team is scheduled to visit the
campus in November 1984 and make a recommendation on
re-accreditation.
"Our most important single objective during the 1983-84
academic year," Rives said, "is adequate preparation
through a well-done self-study indicating that we continue
to offer quality educational programs and services to
students."

Crane, Matzner Announce Retirements, Effective August, 1983

As a tribute to their distinguished careers, we re-print some " warm words " by Professor Hal
Malehorn, colleague and friend.
Bill Crane, renowned cat fancier, and for 26 years a professor at
EIU, will be leaving the Department of Educational Psychology
and Guidance. Bill, notorious as
well for his ready wit, came to
Eastern first in 1952 with a
doctorate in hand, compliments of
Yale. He was Director of Student
A ctivities in Old Main in those early
years, a job that lasted for four
years. A brief interruption took him
DR. WILLIAM CRANE
to Eastern Michigan University
w here he was Associate Dean of Men and "well on the way
to the presidency." However, that job just didn't jell, so Bill
returned to campus. At the persuasion of Emma Reinhart he
signed on with his present department.
Bill has no great and glorious plans for retirement . His
wife, Mathie!, who will simultaneously be bidding farewell
to Charleston High counseling, is likely to try to get Bill to do
some traveling; but, according to Bill, she is not likely to
succeed. He says he will be entertained by watching the
resident joggers trot by his house. And he plans to keep in
touch with his offspring who are "relatively" close by.

Gerry Matzner, soon-to-be an
"ex" School Service person, arrived at Eastern a bit more circu itously: grad studies at Cornell,
three years overseas during WWII ,
teaching at Augustana (the one in
South Dakota, that is), a superintendency in Minnesota, and a
several-year tenure at Rutgers. He
came aboard Eastern in 1955 and
for a while taught all the school
administration courses singlehandDR. GERHARD MATZNER
ed on a three-year cycle. He lists as
highlights of the experience his friendship with President
Buzzard ("a shrewd man") and his affiliation with various
local and national organizations through which he could see
his students make their own mark in the school
administration field.
Travel is definitely of interest to Gerry; he'd just as soon
go around the globe on a tramp steamer as any other way,
but in the meantime he has a couple of hot irons in the fire
which might lead to temporary teaching overseas. But what
with two sons in the Champaign-Urbana area, he and his
wife are not likely to wander too far for too long.
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EIU Receives NCATE Reaccreditation
And Weighs The Process
by Brad Wright, Student Writer

Directly or indirectly, the Education related faculty at the
University, administrators of teacher education programs,
and central administrative staff spent 18 months voluntarily
and laboriously preparing a self-study of over 35 programs
for review on November 8 of 1982. As the time grew near,
tension mounted and Eastern's School of Education was
covered with the face of anticipation .
When the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education ( NCATE) team did arrive, the entire affair was
carried off more than smoothly. According to Dr. Jerry
Robbins, the chairman for the accreditation team, the
preparation for the visit by all involved at Eastern made the
usual tedious task much more manageable.
Robbins said, "We were able to function efficiently
because of Eastern's preparedness."
So, Eastern did everything it was supposed to do
(probably more), and the process was successful. In March
of 1983, the University received notice of re-accreditation
for all programs. But what does it really mean to the School
of Education? What are the benefits of the accreditation
process, and are they worth it?
Ronald Leathers, Assistant to the Dean of the School of
Education and coordinator of the NCATE self-study, said "I
think it is very important that we have a process for policing
ourselves (education), and NCATE does this."
But what about the cost? Leathers added that the
approximate cost of $7,000 for accreditation every 10 years
and an annual membership fee of $440 is reasonable when
compared to the benefits, and he said that one must realize
that it takes a considerable budget to maintain such a large
organization as NCATE.
Leathers said that being accredited by NCATE means
"reputation for quality." He said, "Graduate Schools and
employers know that graduates of Eastern come from a
school that maintains widely accepted standards." Leathers
added that NCATE, in some cases, may also benefit a
graduate in that it may result in a reciprocal agreement
between states. In essence, it makes certification an easier
process for a teacher making an interstate transfer because
of NCATE's quality standards.
Dr. Gene Scholes, Director of Audio Visual and chairman
for Resources and Facilities for Basic Programs in the
self-study, agreed that NCATE accreditation means quality
and said that one of the best ways it addresses "Quality
consciousness" is the self-study. In the words of Dr. Robert
Barger, chairman for Curriculum of Basic Programs in the
NCATE study, 'The self-study process provides an
opportunity for us to take a look at, and reflect upon, our
own programs, making it a point for personal quality
control."
However, Barger added that review by an outside source
is also necessary for quality control. "It is a good idea to
have peers outside of your own academic community to
review the programming, because it is easy to live so close
to your work that the proper perspective for scrutiny is
lost ."
Two important by-products of the self-study were also
mentioned by Dr. Shirley Moore, Dean for Academic
Development and an active participant in the self-study.
One benefit, she said, is the general knowledge that is
personally obtained about the University through the

NCATE process that might not otherwise be known. Moore
said, "I found out all kinds of things that reinforced my
beliefs in the University."
The second by-product that Moore mentioned was the
additional structural cohesion brought about by the needed
interaction of the various levels of organization within the
University during the accreditation process.
Although most involved were quick to point out the
benefits that N CA TE provides to the School of Education
and its students, comments were made concerning some
weaknesses in the process. And there were even some
suggestions for solutions.
Leathers said that NCATE "certainly" helps to keep a
steady interest by the school toward constant improvement
in programming, but he added that having a reaccreditation
requirement of every 10 years also "leaves no question that
last minute improvements and quick repair work to
programs does occur." He suggested that checkup visits
every two or three years might lessen the dilemma.
Realizing that the cost would be greatly increased by
thousands of dollars under the current procedures of
accreditation, Leathers also stated that the process would
have to be simplified in some manner to lessen the financial
burden.
The setting of standards was another problem area that
was mentioned .
Barger said, "One problem with NCATE is that it is simply
a means for providing standards of minimal quality. This
tends to create only acceptable achievement when more
could be accomplished."
Dr. Max Gerling, student teaching coordinator for
mathematics, said that another problem with standards is
how they are evaluated. He said, "Trying to give the full
picture with all the facts in a three-day visit which allows for
only a small degree of the total programming to be viewed
directly by a visiting team is an impossible task." Gerling
said that this is a shortcoming of any accrediting body,
because the cost of more detailed study during visitations is
prohibitive.
A problem that virtually everyone who played a part in the
accreditation process mentioned was that those who are
not directly involved with NCATE are really unaware of the
time consuming effort that produces that final element of
accreditation .
Leathers said that if students were more aware, they
would probably be appreciative of the benefits. "It is
unfortunate that the ultimate beneficiary of accreditation
(the student) is not a more fully aware participant in the
process, but this problem is, perhaps, one of the easier
problems of accreditation to solve," he said. Involvement
programs for students and student participation on
self-study committees were mentioned by several Education
faculty member involved with NCATE.
In all, those who were involved with NCATE, and even
those who were only aware of the process, thought that the
accreditation ideology was a worthy undertaking. Despite
the time, money, effort, and a few shortcomings of the
process, the higher quality of education produced from
accreditation seemed to all a fair trade. Eastern is a
university that was founded and established on education
principles, and it will continue to build on those principles in
the future. The National Council for Accreditation of
Teacher Education has taken part in educational growth at
the university; and with the helpful input of member
universities, such as Eastern, perhaps NCATE will continue
to strengthen its foundation, as well.

EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP: Eighth National Conference of Scholars and Educators
A dynamic and dedicated leadership team has for months
been anticipating each step along the way to an outstanding
Scholar and Educator Conference, Fall 1983. It is
spearheaded by Bob Barger and Ron Leathers of Eastern
Illinois University, the host institution. Enthusiastic coplanning help has come from Bob Miller and Rose Mary
Shepherd of the Regional Superintendent's Office.
The Eighth National Conference of Educators and
Scholars will take place at Eastern Illinois University,
Thursday and Friday, October 6 and 7, 1983, with
sponsoring cooperation from the local university, school,
and regional community.
The theme of the Conference is: "Education and
Scholarship: Community Strength and Individual Needs."
Topics of preliminary proposals include: Legalism and
schooling . Classroom discipline. Computer software and
education . Education to balance work and leisure. High
tech, low touch, new values. Testing for competencies.
Government's changing role. Community instructional
delivery. Cross-cultural education. Senior citizens' unmet
needs. Progress despite resource limitations. Professional
pressure and personal stress.
The Conference is for persons interested in education and
scholarship in the broad sense of sharing specialized

knowledge, informed opinion, and responsible observation.
Its interdisciplinary scope accommodates all schools,
college, and university curricula and operations, as well as
areas of concern throughout the community and the nation.
Professional enrichment and high social purpose make for
its unifying value.
As in the past, the Conference is intended to be modest in
size, low in cost, and convenient in format. In this way more
persons from various backgrounds can have meaningful
opportunity to focus more fully on substantive matters. In
giving attention to individual needs and interest, the
Conference depends on help from everyone to promote
early registration and to submit program information
promptly.
Some of the articles in the journal, Scholar and Educator,
will relate to the Conference topics. The 1983 issues will be
available to all conferees.
For information on registration, contact Conference
Director, Dr. Robert N. Barger, Buzzard Education Building
213, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois 61920,
telephone AC 217-581-5931; or Dr. Jay W. Stein, HH K30,
Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois 61455, telephone AC 309-298-1528.

Regional Institute Program . ..
An important part of the conference will be interaction between educator-minded persons from the public school system
and those affiliated with academia or the community. A Friday morning "teachers institute" (or conference within a
conference) will consist of well-informed and inspiring speakers, panelists, and other participants on vital themes that affect
children, youth, the professions and all segments of the community.
EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP-COMMUNITY STRENGTH AND INDIVIDUAL NEED
REGIONAL INSTITUTE DAY
October 7, 1983
Held on the Campus of Eastern Illinois University
Charleston, Illinois
8:00 - 8:40 a.m.

Sharing in McAfee North Gymnasium

8:40 - 9:50 a.m .

Bill Page
" How To Get Kids To Sit Down, Shut Up, Follow Directions, and Want to Learn " - McAfee
Gymnasium (South)

10:00 - 10:50 a.m .

Choose A Session or Visit Tarble Arts' Center
" Professional Excellence in an Excellent Profession"
Vice- President Glenn W illiams, Eastern Illinois University, McAfee Gymnasium (South )
" Education for the Future in a High Technology Society"
Dean Don Lauda, Dean of the School of Technology, Eastern Illinois University, Phipps' Lecture Hall
" Teacher Enthusiam "
Peggy Herman and Karen Anderson-Sutton, University High School, Normal, Coleman Lecture Hall
"Teacher Negligence and Prevention In and Out of the Classroom"
Dr. Steve Permuth, Dean of College of Education, Bradley University, Buzzard Education Building
Auditorium
" To be Announced"
Booth Library Lecture Room

11 :00a .m.

Bill Page
" Kids Are Always Motivated - The Problem is They are Motivated to do Nothing"
McAfee Gymnasium (South)

Session
For
Administrators

" Administration Negligence and Prevention "
Dr. Steve Permuth, Dean , College of Education, Bradley University, Buzzard Education Building
Auditorium
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From The Guest Editor . ..
Some issues are big enough to apply to everybody in
education. The q1,1estion about when to properly impose our
values upon those we teach, help, or lead is such an issue.
There is not one professional educator who has avoided
significant contact with the question of value imposition.
When students or staff members are being evaluated the
person doing the evaluation may raise the private question:
"Do I really have a right to do this?" When a teacher,
counselor, or administrator is conducting a group discussion there is often a need to decide whether to let it proceed
freely or to limit what can happen. Assignments that one
gives can be more or less open to student, client, or staff
member initiative. The rules a teacher, counselor, or
administrator may establish can be more or less numerous,
more or less definite, and more or less strictly enforced.
Most careers in education are centrally characterized by
what the individual does relative to the question of value
imposition. The two most typical one-word characterizations of administrators are "strong" and "weak." The
strong administrator is presumably willing to stand firm on
value questions and other questions for the good of the
staff. The weak one just lets things go as they will. Teachers
also are labeled in a single word. Some are "hard,"
"tough," or "demanding." Others are "easy." The former
type is usually more disposed to let his or her values
dominate the classroom and what happens in relation to it
than the latter type. Of course, there are other designations
connected with one's reaction to the value imposition issue.
"Authoritarian," "democratic," "dogmatic," and "open"
are just some of these. In any case, what one does in
relation to the question may well have more to do with the
way others see him or her as an educator than anything
else.
Thus, the issue concerning the rightness of value
imposition is pervasive and significant in education. It would
seem that the time spent in carefully thinking through
one's position on the issue would be time well spent. This
edition is devoted to the assistance of readers in this
philosophical task.
Because it asks a question about the rightness of action,
the value imposition issue is a problem in the area of ethics.
Of course, the issue is being raised in relation to the
education professions. A balance between good philosophical substance and clear, practical application will be
necessary; this has been a constant aim through all stages
of the preparation of this edition.
The contributors to this work were selected not only
because of their formal perparation and expertise in applied
philosophy, but also because the editor has discussed and
argued the value imposition issue with each and has noted
enough difference between perspectives to provide some
real alternatives for readers to consider. This should
challenge readers to reconsider their own thinking, for some
of the authors will be launching their best cases against
beliefs that a reader might hold concerning value
imposition, while others may offer new ammunition for the
defense of a position a given reader might agree with.
Each author was asked to begin his article with a position
statement. This includes clarifying remarks, some positive
defense, and a description of what assumption of the
position would mean to a teacher, a counselor, and an
adminstrator.
Dr. Robert Barger's article, "Permitting Individuals to

Create Values," opens the sharing of perspectives. His is
probably the most open stand on imposing values available
today-that of Existentialism. The only values deemed
genuine by that philosophy are those created by personal
decisions. Values imposed from outside individual perspective-whether by a teacher, administrator, counselor,
or anyone else-are not authentic. Thus, Dr. Barger would
have educators give students, staff members, or clients
ample room to make decisions and then honor genuine
decisions they make.
Dr. James Stuart's "Imposing with Respect for Persons"
is based upon the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, an
Idealist position. He holds that reason tells us that everyone
should treat everyone else as subjects, not just as objects to
use. Rules and structure are necessary to serve this
principle, but imposing should always honor the power of
those we serve to reason, not merely as things to be
manipulated at will. His central conclusion is that educators
should maintain due respect for each student, staff
member, or client. This does not mean that a structure
should be avoided. It only need be properly humanistic.
My own "Imposing for Freedom" follows. My view is a
type of Idealism which differs from that of Dr. Stuart in its
stress upon cultural and intercultural factors. I hold that a
liberating education should impose competence in terms of
the given cultures of students, staff members, or clients and
go on to help more mature persons broaden their
appreciation of different lifeways under the terms of the
rational principle of intercultural tolerance. I oppose
imposing a "majority" culture upon everyone, but I favor
having everyone appreciate (and even make use of) what
other cultures have to offer.
Dr. F.R. McKenna is granted the "last word," in
placement of articles, at least. His "A Realist Perspective on
Imposing Values" designates the philosophy he maintains in
its title. Holding that there are objective truths, and
consequently a real means of enhancing life and avoiding
threats of life, he holds that educators are bound to impose
values in accordance with these truths. Dr. McKenna
maintains that "imposition" need not be harsh or
heavy-handed at all. Yet, in that the truth in his position
does not depend upon anyone being aware of it, there are
times when something needs to be done for a student's, a
staff member's, or client's own good.
Following the four articles, the reader will find a rather
unusual section. Each author has read all the other articles,
and each has been asked to briefly critique those articles,
noting positive elements and disadvantages, raising
questions, and introducing counter-arguments. These
critiques are collected in a final section that will hopefully
lend further ·sophistication to the exploration of the issue
and provide an interesting exchange for the enjoyment of
readers.
I am pleased that the editorial staff of Education Journal
has permitted this edition. Its theme and structure depart
from what is usually done. I believe such occasional
departures can be valuable. I know those of us who
contended with the issue and with each other's perspectives
have sharpened our understanding of ourselves as
educators. Hopefully, the readers will also grow by their
participation.
Kenneth Sutton
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The question , "What values should be imposed on a
person 'for their own good'?" can be answered quite
simply: none at all! That, at least, is what an Existentialist
would say in response to the question . The Existentialist
would have to answer in this manner, because from an
Existential point of view, the question seems to involve an
inherent contradiction : Values cannot, at the same time, be
imposed from without and also be for the individual's own
authentic good. The reason for this is that only the
individual can determine what his or her good is; therefore,
only the individual can determine what particular values
would serve that good.
The Existentialist does not believe that there are any
predetermined values existing independently in things. He
or she believes that value is something that occurs only
when an individual creates it by deciding that something is
good for him or her. This viewpoint may be more fully
appreciated by situating it in the total view of Existentialism,
as summarized by C.E. Beck:
1. Man exists in a world of choices. Determinis,n is the
basic fabric of the physical universe, but not of man.
2 . Man must rely on himself and upon his fellow creatures
to adjust to an adamant universe, or perish.
3. Values are names given to terms of praise or dissatisfaction which man assigns to events, things, or ideas
which aid home or hinder him in existing.
4. Existence precedes essence. There is no Grand Plan
into which all events must fit and to which all people
"ought" to attune. Man is. He then evaluates himself
and his world. He does not discover relationships. He
creates them .
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5. Man's physical existence is all he can know. This does
not give him license, but rather casts upon him
responsibility to be what his potential indicates to him.
6. Man's relationship to others must be that of selfrealization for all, and the achievement of creature
comfort through empathy and sympathy in living out
the life span confronting us all.
7. Loneliness is accepted as a fact of life. Longing is an
attribute of man. Both can give rise to noble efforts to
resist despair, or can lead to forlornness. Man chooses.
8. Either: a) there is no God, or b) God created the world
somewhat in the manner described by the eighteenth
century deists. The latter view is that of a creating force
which fashioned man and then left him to his own
devices. (1963, pp. 123-124)
The Existential approach implies that each person sees
reality through different lenses. He or she then creates
"maps" of that reality or "territory" which, while more or
less accurate, are not the reality or territory itself (just as
philosophy is not wisdom but, rather, a seeking after it; and
history is not the past but, rather, an attempt to interpret it).
With respect to values, there is, likewise, no "Grand Plan"
of goodness to which one "ought" to subscribe. Because
man is active and free, he creates the values which he then
utilizes to improve what he defines as the meaning of his
existence. Values, then, must be chosen by each individual
rather than being imposed from outside of the individual.
Ludwig Wittgenstein makes this point clear. He said that
when we hear a command to do something, we ask
ourselves what will happen if we don't do it . But, he said,
"ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in
the usual sense of the terms. So our questions about the
consequences of an action must be unimportant" (1963, p.
442). But he insists that there must be some meaning to the
original question. His conclusion is that external consequences are not important, but internal consequences are .
He said, "There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward
and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action
itself" (p. 422).
In other words, it is not important if people praise or
condemn me for what I do. What is important is what
happens to my personality as a result of my actions. Thus, I
might run into a burning building and rescue an aged person
or a baby, not because I want to be regarded as a hero by
others or because I want to avoid having others think that I
am a coward, but because I think that this is the proper
thing for me to do; by doing it, I give positive definition to
my personality. Likewise, I might not run into the building,
although I feel that I should. In this case, I am being
inauthentic. I am not acting in accord with what I have
defined as right. Here, too, I am fashioning my personality,

but this time I am fashioning it in a negative, destructive
sense. I am creating (becoming) a person who acts contrary
to what he or she believes.
With the foregoing introduction in mind, one can now ask
what practical implications the maintenance of this
philosophic position would have for a teacher. The answer
is perhaps best summed up in a list of points proposed by J.
P. Pine:
1. Teaching is itself a learning process.
2. The learner (whether teacher or student) is a free and
responsible agent.
3. Learning is an experience which occurs inside the
learner and is activated by the learner.
4. Learning is the discovery of the personal meaning and
relevance of ideas.
5. Learning is a consequence of experiencing responsibility.
6. Learning is emotional as well as intellectual.
7. Learning is a valuing experience.
8. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which
encourages people to be active.
9. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which
promotes and facilitates the individual's discovery of
the personal meaning of ideas.
10. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which
emphasizes the uniquely personal and subjective
nature of learning.
11. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which encourages openness of self rather than concealment of
self.
12. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere in which
differences are good and desirable.
13. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which
consistently recognizes people's right to make
mistakes.
14. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere in which
people are encouraged to trust in themselves as well as
in external sources. (1974, pp. 19-24)
The majority of the above-mentioned points are well
illustrated in the following story. A student taking a physics
test was faced with the following question: "Show how it is
possible to determine the height of a tall buildinQ by the use
of a barometer." She put down this answer: "Take the
barometer to the roof of the building. Attach a rope to it and
lower it to the ground. Measure the amount of rope used to
reach the ground. This length will equal the height of the
building." The teacher, on correcting the student's test,
determined that this was not the "right" answer. But, the
teacher decided to let the student try again. This time that
student was told that she must show some knowledge of
physics in answering the question. So the student
responded with the following answer: "Take the barometer
to the roof of the building and drop it off the edge, timing its
fall with a stopwatch until it hits the ground. Then, using the
formula S = ½at2, calculate the height of the building."
Frustrated at not having elicited the right answer, even with
the caution that physics procedures must be used, the
teacher then asked the student to try once more. This time
the student said: "Take the barometer out on a sunny day.
Measure its height and the length of its shadow. Then
measure the length of the shadow of the building. By using
calculations based on simple proportion, the height of the
building can be determined ." Asked if she could not
describe a more sophisticated physics method, the student
readily replied: "Tie the barometer to the end of a string.

Swing it like a pendulum. Determine the value of g at the
street level and at the top of the building. Using the
difference between these two values, calculate the height of
the building." The student went on to volunteer that, if she
were not limited to answers employing physics, even more
solutions would be available. For instance, a person could
go to the manager of the building and say: "If you will tell
me how tall this building is, I will give you this barometer."
Finally, the teacher asked the student if she knew the
answer that the teacher had expected to get. The student
said that she did indeed know, but wanted to show her
ability to solve the problem in a way other than that which
was routinely expected.
In the story narrated above, it is the student, not the
teacher, who exemplifies the Existentialist position which
was previously described. The teacher in the story, in order
to assume an Existential stance, would have to abandon the
notion that there is a right answer at which the student
should arrive (even in such a "hard science" as physics!).
The Existentialist teacher would encourage the creative
attitude shown by the student in this story, instead of
implicitly trying to discourage such an attitude by prodding
toward an expected conformity.
Now the question might be asked, what implications
would the Existentialist position have for an educational
counselor? Most people are familiar with the theory of
non-directive, client-centered counseling espoused by Carl
Rogers. The counselor, according to Rogers, should not
attempt to solve the client's problems for him or her.
Rather, the counselor should assist the client in reflecting on
the problem so that the client solves it for himself or herself.
This theory is none other than the Existentialist position in
counseling. Values are never imposed by the counselor.
Rather, they are elicited from the individual client.
Finally, what can be said of the implications of the
Existentialist position for an educational administrator?
Here, again, a story may be helpful in formulating an answer
to this question. The story is known as the "legend of the
Grand Inquisitor." In The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor
Dostoevsky has one of the brothers, Ivan, create a legend
which is set in sixteenth century Spain during the height of
the Inquisition. He describes the Grand Inquisitor as walking
the streets one day with his henchmen, when the Inquisitor
sees a man approaching in the distance. The man is healing
the sick and raising the dead. A crowd gathers, and
recognizing Him by His works of compassion, the crowd
begins to shout, "It is He, it is He!" Immediately
understanding what is happening, the Grand Inquisitor
orders his henchmen to arrest the man. That night the
Grand Inquisitor visits the man in his dungeon cell. He tells
Him, "I know who you are. You came once before, but
you failed men. I have corrected your work. I have chosen
to serve men better." The Grand Inquisitor continues,
explaining, "The one thing that man cannot bear is his
freedom. But instead of taking this awful burden away from
him, you only made it worse. You made man's freedom
absolute. His responsibility for decisions you made total,
forever binding. But I have lifted this burden off his
shoulders. I have freed man from his freedom. In this way, I
have protected weak man from himself" (1937, pp.
257-272).
The Grand Inquisitor presents a model of the non-Existential administrator. He believes that people cannot be trusted
with the freedom to make an independent decision, because
they might make a mistake. The figure of Jesus in the
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legend, however, presents a model of the Existential
administrator. He frees people so that they can make
choices and can take on themselves the responsibility for
those choices. Etymologically, the word "administrator"
means, "one who serves another." Thus, the term is more
aptly applied to one who facilitates another's freedom of
choice than to one who unilaterally directs another
concerning what shall be done.
By way of comparison, Existentialism stands against
several traditional positions in philosophy. In order to
understand how the Existential position on values compares
with these positions, each must be examined in a systematic
way. First, there is Idealism. This system says that reality is
basically spiritual, that truth is known by the mind, and that
values are immaterial, absolute, and unchanging. Thus,
values must be imposed on the individual. Or, put another
way, the individual must comform to fixed values, rather
than vice versa. Realism, on the other hand, says that reality
is basically material or physical, and truth is best known
through the senses; thus, values are natural, that is, lying in
the mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency.
Again, there is a fixed set of values (this time natural, rather
than spiritual) to which the individual must conform.
Pragmatism, a philosophy which flows out of Realism, sees
reality in a much different perspective than do either
Idealism or Realism. Both of these former philosophies see
reality as a static thing. Pragmatism, however, says that
reality is experience or change-a very dynamic thing.
Thus, in the matter of truth, neither the mind nor the senses
can adequately handle the knowledge of reality. A dynamic
knowledge instrument is needed in order to grasp such a
dynamic reality, and this instrument is the experiment or
test. Pragmatists say that we learn by trying things out.
When they come to the question of values, they have no
fixed universe (either spiritual or material) on which to base
their values. Thus, with values, as with truth, they base their
judgment on results. If a plausible solution solves a problem,
it is a "good" solution. If dropping an atom bomb on Japan
brought the Second World War to an end, it was a good
thing to do from a Pragmatic point of view. But there is a
problem here. What if Emperor Hirohito were asked if it was
a good idea to drop the atom bomb on Japan? The problem,
then, is who is going to judge whether the results are good.
The Pragmatists have ruled out a stable standard once they
accept only fluid views on the nature of reality and truth.
Thus, the only fair way, in their view, to handle decision
making is to let the majority decide. Obviously, in the case
of the atom bomb example, a lot depends on how "the
majority" is defined (e.g., are Japanese going to be
included in it?). A position closely related to Pragmatism is
Cultural Relativism. This position sees the cultural group to
which an individual belongs as the basis for the
identification of that individual (e.g., "I am a Seminole
Indian."). Values for a Cultural Relativist are literally relative
to the culture to which the individual belongs. They are not
relative only to the individual himself or herself.
Some people, however, would rather not entrust the
making of decisions to any kind of majority, and this brings
us to the last system, Existentialism. Most Existentialists
would resist the categorization of their views as being
systematic, but their thinking can at least be paralleled with
the systematic views of the other philosophies. Existentialist
thinking on questions of reality and truth is similar to the
thinking of the Pragmatists on these questions, although
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phrased somewhat differently. Existentialists say, concerning reality, that existence is a given, but that what becomes
of it is not a given. In other words, what a person is is not
the basic question, but rather what he or she becomes. All
people start out existing, but what will they make of their
existence? On the question of truth, Existentialists believe
that the important element of the question pertains to
decision. If there is no set pattern of "givens" in reality, then
truth is not fixed, but rather is a matter of individual choice.
If I think you don't like me, then the truth of the matter, as it
affects me, is that you don't like mel It was earlier
mentioned that the Existential views on reality and truth
parallel the Pragmatist views on reality and truth. Since the
Pragmatists have relative views on reality and truth, it
follows that the Pragmatist views on value would be relative
also, since in a system the more basic metaphysical and
epistemological views tend to shape the axiological views.
The same holds true for the Existentialists. The difference is
that, whereas the Pragmatists look to the group majority as
the decision-making unit concerning relativist values, the
Existentialists say that the inalienable unit of choice is the
individual himself or herself. The main dispute between the
Pragmatists and Existentialists, then, is whether the
individual is basically a part of the group, or whether the
group is basically an assembly of individuals. Often when
questions of reality or truth are being discussed, it will not
be possible to tell the difference between a Pragmatist and
an Existentialist. But when questions of value come up, one
can usually tell the difference by noticing whether an appeal
is made to a social standard (Pragmatic) or to individual
autonomy (Existentialistic).
Viewpoints on values (just as viewpoints on reality and
truth) are basically matters of faith or belief. This assertion is
supported by the "Principle of Uncertainty" which was
articulated by Werner Heisenberg (Gamow, 1958, pp.
51-57). This principle points out that an observer in a
paradigm is never outside the paradigm and, therefore, can
never be completely objective in his or her observations.
The observer can never fully separate himself or herself from
his or her plan of observation. Individuals are influenced by
the plane to which they are related and , incidentally, also
influence the plane which they observe (this is illustrated in
the Social Science field by the Hawthorne Effect). Thus,
everything is more or less relative or subjective. It is in this
sense that selecting a valid philosophy becomes a matter of
choosing which philosophic view best explains the universe.
Nature and meaning are not compulsive things which
impose themselves on us. Rather, they are things which call
for choice among various alternatives (the more alternatives, the better!). Selectio_
n of a world view or philosophy
from which values ultimately arise thus involves subjectivity
and choice. In a sense, then, any philosophy which a person
decides to live by comes down to an Existential philosophy.
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"When should one, as an educator, impose his or her
values upon students, clients, or staff members?" This is
the question upon which I have been asked to take a stand .
The question, as I understand it, is a moral question . It asks,
"Under what conditions would it be morally justified for an
educator to impose his or her values upon students, clients,
and staff members?" Thus, the question does not concern
such matters as, "How much value imposition can I get
away with?" Or, "Which values can be imposed on others
without producing complications for me?" We are
considering what is morally permissible, not what is
prudent.
"When is it morally permissible for an educator to impose
his or her values upon students, clients, or staff members?"
Although it is not clear to me that there is a single answer to
this question which covers one's relations t<? a~I of th~se
groups, I would like to suggest a general principle which
provides some guidance for our actions. The principle
derives from the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It says
that our actions should be such as to respect others as free
and rational beings: to treat others as ends and not merely
as a means to our own ends (Kant, 1963, pp. 96-98).
Therefore, the educator is not justified in imposing his or her
values where this involves a failure to respect students,
clients, and staff members as free and rational individuals.
I will begin by attempting to explain what this principle
means and then suggest how it can be employed to assist
our thinking about the issue of values imposition. After it is
understood how the principle works in practice, I will
compare it to other sorts of principles which one might
employ in dealing with the imposition of values.
What does this principle mean? The first thing to get clear
about it is the difference involved in treating someone as an
end as opposed to treating someone merely as a means. For
Kant this comes down to claiming that we ought to treat
individuals as persons and not as objects. So, what does

that mean? One of the essential notions connected with
being a person is the ability to think: to choose certain goals
and determine the means by which they can be reached .
Kant calls this "rationality." If such rational deliberation is to
have any point, of course, one must be free to act on one's
choices. Indeed, to be free, according to Kant, involves just
the ability to act from rational deliberation, instead of acting ·
merely from one's desires or inclinations. Freedom is what
gives value or worth to humans; in short, it is what makes
them persons rather than mere things or objects. It is also
what makes humans capable of moral action.
Given the nature of persons as free, rational beings, the
principle asserts that it is wrong to ignore their nature by
treating them as though they were mere objects. To get a
feel for what it means to treat something as an object,
consider the way in which we use "things." Take, for
instance, the manner in which we treat our cars. Since our
cars are among the most expensive of our possessions and
represent a sizeable investment, we probably treat them
better than most of the other things we own, say a shovel or
a chair. We may be careful to keep our cars well maintained
and even to wash and polish them occasionally.
Nevertheless, we still treat a car as an object. If it is involved
in an accident or develops serious mechanical difficulties,
we may decide to trade it for another one, or even to junk it.
In so doing, we do not think we have acted improperly. This
is because the car has value only so long as it can perform
its function . It is valued, to use Kant's language, as a
means, and not as an end in itself. Since the car is only an
object, even though a very expensive one, its value consists
only in what it can do for us; when it can no longer perform
its function, we discard it and get another.
Now, there is nothing immoral about using the car merely
to satisfy our needs and simply disposing of it later. It is an
object, and to manipulate it for our purposes is to u_se it
properly. But the case is far different with human bem~s.
Their value is not merely extrinsic or external to some desire
or goal we happen to have, for we are dealing with persons
and not objects . Persons have value in and of themselves.
That which makes them valuable, the fact that they are free
and rational beings, provides the clue to what it is to treat
them as persons and not things. We are obligated to "treat"
persons so that we do not violate their rational fr~edom._
One way a person's rational freedom can be violated 1s by
telling the person a lie. Imagine that I offer you a job and
agree to pay you $300 for one week's work. Suppose at the
end of the week I decide to pay you only $100, even though
your work was completely satisfactory. By deceiving you
regarding the amount you were to be paid, I have
manipulated you and, thus, violated your rational freedom .
If you had known you would receive only $100 for your
labor, you might have decided to take a different job or,
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perhaps, to wait until you received a better offer. By lying to
you, I have denied you the opportunity to make a rational
choice and, therefore, the opportunity to act freely, since I
have withheld the necessary information upon which a
rational choice could have been made. I have used you to
satisfy my desires and purposes without regard for your
own desires or purposes. In other words, I have treated you
as an object and not as a person, as a means rather than an
end.
This is not to suggest that it is wrong to treat other
persons as a means to some end. What is wrong is to treat a
person merely as a means. When I offer you the job for a
week and pay you the $300 I have promised you, I am using
you as a means. I have work that needs to be done, and you
are the means by which that work is accomplished. But
provided that I do not misrepresent the nature of the job nor
the pay you are to receive, I have not treated you only as a
means. That is, I have not interfered with you making a
rational choice concerning whether or not you should
accept the job. So, there is a vast difference in the two
cases. When I misrepresent the job or the amount you are to
be paid, you are denied the opportunity to exercise your
rational freedom and are being used only as a means.
There are, of course, more direct and violent ways of
denying one's freedom. Rape, theft, and kidnapping are
rather obvious examples. Each of these, as well as the lying
example, involve treating persons as if they were objects.
The victim is being used to satisfy the desires or goals of the
assailant while his or her desires or goals are ignored or even
violated. At this point, the following difficulty arises: If it is
wrong to interfere with the freedom of others in seeking
their goals and satisfying their desires, how can we justify
interfering with the activities of rapists or thieves? By
interfering with their actions, are we not ignoring their
desires or goals and treating them merely as objects rather
than persons?
In such cases, we must remember that the actions we are
opposing are themselves violations of the freedom of
others. By failing to oppose such activities through laws
prohibiting such behavior and sanctions for their violations,
we are failing to value the freedom of other persons.
Ordinarily, only the appropriate legal authorities have the
right to interfere with the actions of those attempting to
harm others. But there are exceptions. We generally
recognize the right of self-defense and the right, if not the
obligation, to come to the aid of someone whose life is in
jeopardy because of the hostile acts of another. Intervention
is justified in such instances since we are acting to prevent
an intrusion on another person's freedom (Kant, 1965, pp.
230ft). Thus, the principle that we should respect the
freedom of other persons justifies limiting the freedom of an
individual in order to prevent him or her from violating the
freedom of another. This is not inconsistent with the general
principle that it is wrong to interfere with the freedom of
another. In fact, limiting the freedom of those who violate
the freedom of others is justified on the grounds that
violating the freedom of another person is wrong (Gregor,
1964, pp. 44-45).
The moral principle I am recommending, then, says we
should always treat others as ends or persons and not
merely as a means or an object. As we have seen, this
comes down to saying we ought not interfere with the
freedom of other persons unless they are, themselves,
interfering with another person's freedom. Thus, aggressive
behavior toward others is ruled out. But a more subtle
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implication of treating others as persons is that it rules out
claiming for myself a liberty in action which is not
compatible with a like liberty for all. Take, for example, not
paying one's taxes. Kant would claim that this sort of act is
incompatible with allowing a like liberty for all. For, if no one
paid taxes, all of our public institutions would collapse with
devastating results for the well being of society. So, one
who does not pay his or her taxes is not willing to extend to
others the same freedom. In failing to pay one's taxes, one
becomes a sort of parasite, and that involves treating others
as a means and not as an end or person (Murphy, 1970, pp.
104-105).
Now that we have a basic understanding of the moral
principle, I will make a recommendation for dealing with
questions of value imposition. I want to point out some of
the advantages of employing a principle of this sort, instead
of relying upon a list of moral rules for guidance. Rules tend,
largely, to reflect the current popular moral standards and
conventions of a particular society at a particular time.
Thus, as society changes, the rules must change in order to
keep pace. This may suggest that morality is purely relative,
and that nothing is "right" or " wrong" apart from the
changing moral standards of society. Secondly, moral rules
tend to be laid down in an absolute fashion by
indoctrination. (I am assuming, for the moment, that
indoctrination is wrong.) This inevitably raises questions of
whether there are any valid exceptions to these rules and
what the justification for such exceptions might be. Finally,
there is a perennial problem of conflicting rules. What are
we to do when two or more rules, all of which appear
applicable to a given situation, instruct us to do
incompatible actions?
In contrast, the principle I am recommending does not
involve attempting to impose, or make obligatory,
contemporary moral standards. Instead, it provides a
criterion for determining morally correct behavior and for
judging the correctness of those moral standards that
currently exist. The criterion is that it is always wrong to
treat persons as though they are mere objects, as a mere
means to some end and not as an end in themselves. We
have already seen what this principle means. It implies that
there is a moral constant, despite the fact that the mores of
society are constantly changing. Obviously, since there is
only one moral principle involved, there can be no conflict
among principles as there may be among a set of moral
rules .
What about the tendency toward indoctrination? The
nature of the principle being proposed does not lend itself to
promoting the goals often associated with indoctrination.
Any view, of course, can be presented in such a way that it
amounts to indoctrination, but it is much more difficult to
imagine this occurring with our proposed principle than with
a set of moral rules.
The significance and, I hope, the suitability of our
principle, that we should always treat others as ends and
not merely as a means to some other end, will emerge in its
application to practical cases involving value imposition. Let
us begin by taking a case from the classroom:
A young high school teacher has a discipline problem
in his social studies class. Three students who usually
sit in the back of the classroom are often disruptive in
their behavior. They often talk to each other instead of
participating in the class discussion and, as a result,
interfere with those students who are attempting to

discuss issues pertaining to the assigned topics.
Although the teacher has made some attempts to
restore order, these have proved unsuccessful. It
always seems that just as the discussion is warming up
and progress is being made, the class is disrupted by
loud talking and laughter. The teacher worries about
taking more drastic steps to correct the situation; he is
concerned about imposing his values (the importance
of order and understanding the issues involved in class
discussion) on others. After all, he reasons, those
being disruptive are not physically harming anyone,
and the other students appear at times to enjoy the
interruptions. He tells himself that perhaps he should
be more tolerant of their behavior, even though he
personally feels that what they are doing is wrong.
As most teachers will recognize, this is often a very
difficult situation. There are other factors to be considered
in addition to the possibility that in disciplining the students
the teacher is unjustifiably imposing his values on others. A
teacher's confidence in his or her ability is often at stake in
severe discipline situations, since some control over what
takes place in the classroom is a necessary condition for the
teacher's effectiveness. Because the teacher is under
pressure, there may be a strong temptation to act without
thinkinQ. One of the advantages of having a guiding
principle in such cases is that it lessens the likelihood that
one will act without thinking.
What action does our principle prescribe in this situation?
This is clearly a case in which interference with someone's
freedom is justified on the grounds of protecting the
freedom of others. The disruptive behavior on the part of a
few students in the class violates the freedom of those who
wish to learn. Thus, the principle upholds the teacher's right
to interfere with those who are disrupting the class. The
interference is justified in terms of protecting the freedom of
those who are not themselves interfering with the freedom
of others.
There are all sorts of other ways in which values are
imposed on students whenever one teaches. In the typical
classroom situation, students expect their work will be
evaluated. When a teacher evaluates a student's performance, some standard of what counts as outstanding,
acceptable, or unacceptable work is going to be employed,
even if the teacher is only vaguely aware of the nature of the
standard. But employing values is not necessarily to impose
them. Is the teacher imposing his or her values on the
students? I think the answer is obviously, yes. The teacher
employs his or her standards of evaluation without the
student's consent to that particular standard of evaluation.
Even if the students are informed of what the standards are,
they are seldom discussed or justified. Similar points could
be made about many other aspects of the student-teacher
relationship in which value imposition is clear. Even
encouraging your students to study is an imposition of
values upon the students; they are being told, implicitly at
least, that knowledge is good and, therefore, worth working
for. Moreover, the student is not usually given the
opportunity to discuss this value or to be made aware of
opposing views (Bereiter, 1978, pp. 20-25).
Assuming that these are cases of value imposition, the
question is whether they are morally justified. Does such an
imposition of values violate our principle that persons are to
be treated as ends and not merely as a means to some end?

As we have seen, this means we are not justified in treating
persons so as to violate their rational freedom. In the case of
evaluating a student's work, although this involves value
imposition, the student's rational freedom is not deniedprovided that two conditions are met: ( 1) The student is not
led to believe that a certain standard is going to be
employed when, in fact, the teacher employs a different
standard. (2) The standard itself is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. Although the student has no voice in what the
standard will be and may be powerless to change it, this sort
of value imposition is usually implicit in the teacher-student
relationship. As long as the standards are reasonable, one's
rational freedom is not being denied. Much the same can be
said of the teacher's upholding of knowledge as worth
pursuing, even though no effort is made to present
opposing viewpoints.
The test of value imposition in the student-teacher
relationship, then, is: Does this violate the rational freedom
of another person? Does it involve treating others as objects
and not as persons? Although some forms of value
imposition do not amount to denying the rational freedom
of another, it would seem that moral indoctrination does. As
we have seen, some forms of value imposition, such as
evaluating a student's work and maintaining classroom
order, are often implicit in the student-teacher relationship,
but indoctrination in moral values is surely not. When one
attempts to impose moral beliefs on one's students, one is
attempting to deny them the exercise of their rational
freedom. Since indoctrination deprives students of the
opportunity to discuss the merits of the beliefs being
promoted and are not presented with what may be said
against them, they are denied the opportunity to decide for
themselves whether the beliefs ought to be accepted.
Now, this claim might be objected to by pointing out that
the students are free to accept or reject the moral views
being offered by the teacher. Theoretically, this is true.
Practically, however, the objection turns out to be rather
naive, since for many students there may be little moral
knowledge against which to judge the views being
promoted. Also, the influence of the teacher as an authority
figure must be taken into account. In light of these
considerations, the students may be little more than an
object being manipulated by the teacher.
Another sort of value imposition, which directly concerns
administrators more than teachers, arises in connection
with rules and regulations governing the behavior of
students. One such example is a student dress code. (What
we say about dress codes can be applied to other types of
rules and regulations.) Obviously, any sort of dress code
limits the freedom of students with respect to what they
wear and, perhaps, to matters of personal grooming, such
as length of hair. It is an instance of value imposition since
students are being told how they ought not to dress.
Referring to the principle we are employing for deciding the
moral acceptability of value imposition, are such restrictions
of a person's freedom morally justified?
Consider a dress code which restricts, among other
things, the length of hair and forbids wearing shorts to
classes. Given the emphasis placed upon valuing human
freedom by our principle, we should expect that such
restrictions on freedom, if they are going to be justified,
must be justified in terms of protecting the freedom of
others. (This, as we saw, was the case with the discipline
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example discussed earlier.) In this instance, it is difficult to
see how a dress code could be justified on those grounds. It
appears to restrict the freedom of students without any
apparent benefits of promoting or protecting their freedom.
Thus, imposing this dress code on students seems to be a
case of unjustified value imposition. Does this imply that no
dress code could be justified? Not necessarily. If we can
imagine students dressing in such a way (or perhaps failing
to dress sufficiently) that it disrupted school activities, a
dress code restricting such dress would be justified. In this
case, the restrictions on student freedom serve to preserve
the freedom of other students to pursue their studies and
engage in other school activities.
A final example of value imposition is taken from the
counseling experience:
Mary, a 14-year-old student, waited outside of Ms.
Watson's office. She felt alone and afraid.
"Please come in Mary." She walked in slowly and
sat down. When she was finally able to speak, she
described her situation to Ms. Watson. Mary was
pregnant and terribly afraid her parents would find
out. She wanted advice about whether she should
have an abortion.
Ms. Watson was personally a strong anti-abortionist. She believed that the fetus is a human person and
that destroying it is equivalent to murder. As she
listened to Mary tell her story she decided she must
convince her not to have an abortion. She felt sorry for
Mary and the problems not having an abortion would
cause, but her mind was made up.
This is a clear case of value imposition, but is the
imposition justified? The answer, I think, is no. Ms.
Watson's treatment of Mary is an example of attempting to
violate her rational freedom. In coming to Ms. Watson, it
was reasonable for Mary to assume that she would advise
her with Mary's best interests in mind and not receive an
account of Ms. Watsons moral beliefs. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that Mary's best interests were not an important
factor in Ms. Watson's decision, if they were considered at
all. Instead, she attempted to convince Mary of her moral
beliefs. (Whether a counselor is justified in attempting to
convince a counselee of his or her moral beliefs is a
debatable matter among counselors, although there
appears to be nothing morally wrong in such an attempt
itself [Gladstein, 1976, pp. 334-338].) So, Mary's rational
freedom was not violated simply because Ms. Watson
attempted to convince her that she should not have an
abortion.
Mary's freedom was violated, because Ms. Watson failed
to help Mary understand the various options open to her
and what the likely consequences of following those options
were. Moreover, she failed to do this in a context in which it
could be reasonably expected that such assistance would be
provided. By simply telling her she should not have an
abortion, she reduced Mary's opportunity to exercise her
own rational freedom and arrive at her own decision. After
informing her of her options and their likely consequences,
it would have been morally permissible for Ms. Watson to ·
inform Mary of her own values and the reasons for them.
But imposing her values on Mary through indoctrination,
violated Mary's rational freedom; she was treated more like
an object than a person.
Enough ha~ been done now to convey the general
significance of adopting the principle I am suggesting for
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guidance in values imposition decisions. Such significance
can be better appreciated by comparing this principle to two
other competing views, Ethical Relativism and Utilitarianism.
Ethical Relativisim is a much misunderstood view. Those
who profess to be Ethical Relativists often have only the
vaguest notion of what the view involves, except, perhaps,
an opposition to any sort of moral absolutism. As I
understana the position, the Ethical Relativist is asserting:
"What society believes to be morally right is morally right in
the society." Thus, morality is relative in the following way.
If a society, call it X, believes that an activity such as
abortion is morally wrong, then abortion is morally wrong in
X. However, if another society, call it Y, believes that
abortion is morally right, then it is morally right in Y. The
moral beliefs of a society, then, determine what is morally
right and wrong. That is, abortion is morally right in X but is
morally wrong in Y. Hence, we can say that the moral
rightness or wrongness of a practice, abortion for example,
is relative to the moral beliefs of a given society (Taylor,
1975, pp. 13-30).
Now, what would be the implication of replacing the
moral principle we employed earlier in resolving issues of
values imposition with Ethical Relativism? The results, I am
afraid, are neither terribly helpful nor interesting. Since what
is morally permissible, for the Ethical Relativist, turns .out to
be identical with that which society believes to be morally
permissible, we only need to inquire about the present moral
beliefs of society in order to tell what is morally right or
wrong. Thus, in the classroom discipline case, since society
in general disapproves of disorder, it seems clear that the
teacher is morally justified in preventing disruption.
In the abortion case (notice that a controversial issue is
involved here), is Ms. Watson justified in attempting to
convince Mary not to have an abortion? Two distinct issues
are involved and must be considered in our answer. The first
concerns the beliefs of society about the morality of
abortion; it is difficult to say whether overall society
approves or disapproves of abortion. Secondly, I doubt that
society has any clear-cut beliefs regarding the moral
permissibility of a counselor attempting to convince a
counselee of his or her moral beliefs. If these two points are
correct, then the Ethical Relativist is going to be unable to
decide whether Ms. Watson was morally justified in
attempting to convince Mary not to have an abortion.
Moreover, I do not think the Ethical Relativist's inability to
be helpful here is an isolated instance. Since, for the
Relativist, the rightness or wrongness of an act is
determined by the moral beliefs of society with respect to
that act, it follows that on many extremely controversial
issues Ethical Relativism is going to be unhelpful. For if we
cannot decide whether society believes that a certain act is
morally right or wrong, then, by employing Ethical
Relativism, we cannot know whether it is morally right or
wrong.
One implication greatly associated with Ethical Relativism
is tolerance. Since what is morally right or wrong is merely
relative, the argument runs that we should be tolerant of the
moral opinions of those who disagree with us. The
suggestion seems to be that if what is morally right or wrong
is only relative, then it is not important enough to be
intolerant about. But if Ethical Relativism supports tolerance
at all, it supports only the notion that we should be tolerant
of the moral beliefs of those from other societies; it does

nothing to support the view that we should be tolerant of
the beliefs of those who disagree with us in our society.
Within our own society, what society believes to be morally
right or wrong determines what is morally right or wrong;
thus, one moral belief is not as correct as another. It follows
that if your moral beliefs differ from the prevailing moral
beliefs of society, you are simply mistaken, and your moral
beliefs are false. There appears to be little in this to
encourage the notion of tolerance. In addition to this, there
is nothing in Ethical Relativism to prevent one of the moral
beliefs of my society to be intolerant of everyone who
disagrees with us with respect to morality. In that case, it
would be morally wrong for us to be tolerant of moral
opinions contrary to our own, regardless of whether those
opinions are held by those within our society or by those
from other societies.
In any case, tolerance is not very helpful in dealing with
cases of value imposition. The principle of tolerance might
be thought to suggest that values should never be imposed.
But as we have seen, some values imposition is inevitable;
the important question is when is it morally permissible and
when is it not morally permissible? To be told that we should
be tolerant is of little help. Although being tolerant might
rule out the indoctrination of Mary by Ms. Watson, it is of
no help in dealing with cases which involve restricting the
freedom of some persons in order to protect the freedom of
others. Are we simply to tolerate those who are disrupting
the class? But that ignores the values, not to mention the
welfare, of those who want to learn. It seems clear that
tolerance is not the sort of moral principle required to deal
effectively with the issue of value imposition.
The other view we want to look at is a version of
Utilitarianism. It asserts that the rightness or wrongness of
an act is determined by whether it promotes the greatest
balance of happiness over unhappiness for all of those
affected by the act. An act that produces the most
happiness and the least unhappiness for all of those affected
is right; one that fails to do so is wrong. Therefore, an act,
such as telling a lie, would sometimes be right and
sometimes wrong, depending upon its actual consequences. If my lying results in more happiness than telling·
the truth, then lying to you was morally right. The rightness
or wrongness of the act is determined, then, solely by its
consequences; did the act of lying promote the greatest
balance of happiness over unhappiness for all affected by
the act (FranKena, 1973, pp. 34-60).
Despite the popularity and initial plausibility of this
principle (right acts are those that help people, wrong acts
are those that harm people), it is, I think, defective. This can
be most clearly seen in the classsroom discipline example. It
can be argued that the act which promotes the greatest
happiness and the least unhappiness for all affected, is to
allow the occasional interrruptions to the class. The class,
as we saw, enjoys the interruptions; and if we suppose that

only a few students really want to learn the material,
perhaps that act that would promote the greatest balance of
happiness is to allow the occasional outbursts rather than to
take the harsh measures necessary to control them. Thus,
on the Utilitarian theory, allowing the violation of the
freedom of a few is justified if it promotes the greatest
happiness of the greatest number.
This, in general, is the fatal flaw in the version of
Utilitarianism we are considering. It allows well-being and
even rights to be violated if it results in the greatest balance
of happiness for all concerned. Indoctrination, to take
another example of value imposition, can be opposed by the
Utilitarian only if it can be shown that it creates a balance of
unhappiness over happiness. But suppose it could be
shown that indoctrination results in a balance of happiness
over unhappiness. In that event, the Utilitarian is committed
to supporting it, despite the fact that the rational freedom of
some people will be denied. I think this is enough to suggest
that Utilitarianism is not a very promising moral principle for
dealing with value imposition.
I have tried to show that the Kantian principle which says
that we "always ought to treat persons as ends and never
merely as a means" is a useful moral principle in
distinguishing justified cases of value imposition questions,
Ethical Relativism and Utilitarianism. While I do not want to
claim that the Kantian principle is the only and final answer
to value imposition questions, it does appear to be very
useful and to be free of the defects discussed in connection
with Relativism and Utilitarianism. Nor do I wish to claim
that it is without its own difficulties. These, however, will be
best discussed in light of any appropriate objections raised
by my able colleagues in this venture.
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The view that some values should be imposed for
freedom's sake might seem to be a contradiction. This is
because so many people wrongly believe freedom and
structure are opposites. In fact, freedom requires a
structure. Keeping "hands off" those we serve may often
leave whatever limitations they have intact. Limited people
are hardly free!
I hold that a liberating educator would be one who
imposes the values of cultural competence and intercultural
tolerance. Those who perform adequately in terms of their
own lifeways are freed from the frustration of unnecessary
failures in everyday living. Those who can tolerate other
lifeways are relieved of biases that prevent them from
appreciating as broadly as they might and from making use
of viable alternatives.
Each of these values is to be imposed at the proper time.
Cultural competence is the appropriate theme of early
education. Once a person is reasonably secure in his or her
cultural setting, the attempt to broaden that person's
perspective can properly begin.
During the earliest part of their lives, people are not yet
inducted into a way of life. Nevertheless, a way of life
demands that they live according to its terms.
Enculturation begins at birth. Adults are necessary to
maintain infants; and their maintenance is according to
distinctive lifeways. In the United States, for instance, one
characteristically enters a clean world. Everything and
everyone is carefully scrubbed. The baby is even kept
behind glass for most of the time . Someone born within a
group of persons not yet emerged from the stone age can
have a very different experience. Iii any case, powerful
influences tug one toward a specific way of life from the
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beginning, and these influences continue as initial
dependence is gradually left behind (Gollnick and Chinn,
1983, pp. 8-10).
The power and pervasiveness Qf the cultural environment
is much better appreciated today than in times prior to
serious ethnological study. The fact that culture is an
inseparable part of a person's identity has become
increasingly clear. "Individuality" itself has come to be less
atomistic:
Primarily, we view the individual, not as a bundle of
psychic forces, but as a unit of society and a bearer of
culture. We view him [her] as at once the creator
and-to a degree-the creature of culture (Goodman,
1967, p. 13).
Those old enough for school have already been drawn into
a given culture enough to see themselves in terms of it on a
significant level. This is why minority students often resist
some "cultural transmitter" who attempts to pull everyone
into the majority culture (Shinn, 1972, pp. 319-321). The
attempt is easily unmasked as " cultural chauvinism." Not
only is such an educator declaring an impractical "war" on
some students, he or she is denigrating lifeways as less than
important for schools (Garcia, 1982, p. 77).
The alternative to cultural chauvinism does not have to be
some form of permissiveness that is too misguided to even
correct clear incompetence. Those of us who are educators
can insist upon students becoming competent in the terms
of their own cultures.
There is a lot of challenge in this. Young students have
passed from a "stage A," where they just react to cultural
demands, to a "stage B," where they have become
sensitive to the shortcomings of being a baby (Titiev, 1963,
pp. 481-490). Of course, we all know that seeing the need to
grow up is one thing; but actually, growing up is quite
another. The discripline of an educator can be important.
When someone is competent enough to enter the world
of work, the military service, or leave home for further
study, significant encounters with different cultural groups
can occur. Previously, a certain sheltering was proper for
the purpose of permitting an identity to be established. The
fact that someone else isn't as concerned about punctuality
as oneself may seem odd or amusing until one is in a
situation demanding that different sense of time. In the
adult world, someone in charge may demand a different
sense of time, and this may be for an extended period.
Such encounters are painful at first, but they are
necessary occasions for properly neutralizing biases. Such a
neutral disposition toward those who are different is not
basically different from the "scientific predisposition"
necessary for anthropological research (Benedict, 1934, p.
3).

Educators can participate in neutralization of biases by
drawing students into a greater variety of perspectives. This
is the path to tolerance but the first part of the way is very
confusing. A student may ask, " How can I like both ways of

seeing and doing things? And that student will like both! In
time, and often with the sympathetic counsel of an
educator, the student can come to understand that what
appears to be a snarl of contrary ideas and procedures is
only broadened appreciation. The tensions are explained
and relieved in a great principle of intercultural tolerance
(Sutton, 1970, pp. 31-39).
When the value of intercultural tolerance is realized as a
principle it breaks down moral and practical limits. I think of
it as a contemporary version of what Immanuel Kant called a
"supreme practical principle" or "categorical imperative"
(Kant, 1960, pp. 476-4n). As Kant believed of his more
subjective stress upon treating all persons as subjects, I
believe the value of intercultural tolerance can serve as a
"general practical law." At the same time, this principle fits
the less atomistic idea of individuality of modern times
better than Kant's formulation. One could certainly will to
have everyone realize intercultural tolerance with the
rational confidence that the world would be vastly improved
in its moral and social aspects.
Any real education should culminate with liberation from
the limits of particular cultural perspectives. It is what we
can mean in our time by a "broadening experience."
Adoption of my view would mean different things to
people who work with persons on different levels of
development. Due to this, I will break down its application
by level of education, as well as educational role.
Elementary educators would mostly stress growth of
competence within various cultural terms of students.
Ordinarily, the elementary educator is centrally concerned
with basics, those attainments necessary to sustain persons
in everyday life. As was previously evident, I believe those
attainments should be properly defined by the given
cultures of students.
Elementary teachers should be primarily involved in
interpreting student needs relative to their respective
cultures and giving intelligent guidance toward meeting
those needs. This resembles the emphasis upon interpretation and guidance so central to the educational thought of
John Dewey (1963).
However, I am more inclined than Dewey to consult
parents and community members, as well as students, in
interpreting needs. Needs as felt by students can be too
individual to be profitably pursued in school. This will be
very apparent whenever one champions a given child's
interest in opposition to his or her cultural community.
While some think this would be a favor to a child, we must
remember that the home and community are places where
the child must learn to live; they are the real arenas of
success or failure. Certain frustration is no favor!
I would have content and specific learning processes
differ as cultural groups differ from each other. This is
certainly more tailored to student needs than uniform
materials and singular activities for everyone. However, it is
not to be more permissive than traditional education in the
excellence demanded. No one should be permitted to
rem~in a helpless baby in terms of his or her cultural group.
I maintain that those who counsel elementary level clients
should go beyond the limits of a client-centered approach.
When a person substantially differs from principles, values,
and practices of his or her cultural group, that person is to
be regarded as socially deviant, as he or she properly is. As
in teaching, the feeding of a desire opposed to the lifeway of
that group to which the client belongs is not the act of

freedom it may appear to be. Someone who can't function
successfully in his or her own social environment is merely
adrift, not free.
Even if an elementary counselor moves up from a kind of
psychological atomism to the level of persons-in-cultures,
there is still a need to give directions. Younger people are
not yet mature in the ways of the respective groups that
contribute to their identities. The counselor must advise,
when needed, for the sake of progress relevant to a given
client. The extent of structuring on the counselor's part will
vary according to cultures of given clients. The degree of
personal initiative or activity proper to a person differs
considerably from culture to culture.
The elementary administrator should mainly function as a
person who maintains and enhances the overall structure
that processes cultural competence. He or she would try to
hire staff members capable of appreciating the different
lifeways represented in the school(s). He or she would
impose such rules for functioning and conduct interim
evaluations under such standards as would encourage
skillful teaching within proper cultural contexts and would
cause any cultural chauvinists in the school(s) to be ill at
ease in their positions. Money for materials and staff
development would be parceled in such fashion as to have
materials sufficiently broad in cultural representations and
to have staff members broadened in perspective. The
administrator would also strive to be an excellent example to
staff members in dealings with students, being able to relate
to different groups appropriately and strong enough to insist
upon excellence of attainment for each group.
Those who educate adolescents have the everlasting
problem of determining whether or not they are really grown
up. My views are no more immune to this puzzle than any
others. Much of secondary level education would resemble
elementary education in working on development of a
reasonable degree of competence in particular cultural
terms; but some older adolescents would require a
broadening kind of education, due to significant inter•
cultural encounters. (Some, for instance, enter the world of
work during adolescence.)
When such encounters become evident, secondary
teachers can intensify student involvement in the world of
alternative perspectives. "Right answer" instruction should
give way to instruction that questions. Science, for
instance, might be opened up to the contending
philosophies underlying its altenative meanings. Students
should also be made aware of the sincere existence of
religious alternatives around the world. The multicultural
factor should be an essential element in various social
studies. In sum, differences should not be ignored at a time
when those taught are beginning to feel a need to come to
terms with the fact of difference.
Of course, the upper level secondary teacher must
remember that the new stage is only beginning for many.
The broadening experience occasioned should be appropriately gradual and gentle.
As is the case when elementary and secondary teaching
roles are compared in relation to my view, much of the work
of secondary administrators is like that of elementary
administrators. Students are typically still developing a
reasonable degree of competence in terms of their own
cultures as the main task of their development at this point.
Yet, to the extent that significant intercultural encounters
are beginning, there will be some difference. Secondary
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administrators should be more overt than those on
elementary levels when intergroup clashes need to be
resolved. Students should form a clear concept that others
have a right to be different. While tolerance is to be
practiced by staff on every level of education, students on
the secondary level should be shown the need to adopt
tolerance as a clear value of their own. Also, due to the fact
that some staff members are beginning to be involved in
broadening student perspectives, secondary administrators
should be prepared to support them against possible
community opposition. Although there is no general attack
upon anything central to any culture going on in secondary
schools as I would have them conduct their business, there
is some departure from cultural narrowness that may be
threatening.
Secondary counselors will need to deal with intergroup
matters somewhat more than those who work with younger
persons. Some of their clients have already entered the
world of work, and everyone will very possibly have
occasion for significant cultural encounter in the near
future . Some will become more fully employed, others will
enter military service, and still others will study in higher
education institutions . These environments frequently
require people with differing ways of life to function
together, and sometimes they require some to function
according to a set of rules other than their own. (One's
boss, drill sergeant, or instructor may have a life style
different from one's own!) If the secondary counselor is to
help clients avoid unnecessary frustration in an immediately
approaching time in their lives, he or she should begin to
lead them toward being able to cope with difference. This is
an important part of vocational counseling, for most jobs
require successful interaction with a variety of people. It is
also an underlying problem in personal counseling on this
level. Those who plan to leave home will encounter
differences without the degree of protection against their
effects they formerly enjoyed.
Educators of adults differ from those who work with
children and adolescents in that they are mainly concerned
about broadening appreciation and participation. Whenever
a pupil is too smugly anchored in a perspective, the
instructor should be poised to make alternative perspectives
as attractive as they can legitimately be. Criticism can also
be a powerful tool to reduce dogmatism . Fair treatment of
alternatives is crucial. It can lead students to see that those
who differ from them can hardly be considered fools.
The initial effect of such instruction, combined with
significant intercultural encounters of the college environment, will be student confusion. Some may feel guilt,
believing they have betrayed their own lifeways in learning
to tolerate and even like aspects of other cultures.
Counselors, instructors, and others who deal with such
students should lead them to see the positive aspects of
what is happening to them. They may ask (at the same time
complimenting a given student), "Is it so terrible to like
more kinds of things and more kinds of people than you
used to?" This is an appeal to reason that can be extended
to lead the student to conclude that it is neither a
contradiction nor is it morally weak to positively entertain
differing sets of values if one maintains an enveloping
principle of intercultural tolerance.
Administrators in higher education ought to work toward
assuring a plurality of ideas and practices. Students should
not be permitted the damaging "security" of a narrow
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education. No one, whether in liberal arts, a professional
school, or on an undergraduate or graduate level, should
pursue a narrow course of study in a single field. A variety of
perspectives should be encouraged by hiring practices and
in permitting a voice to each of those perspectives. Narrow,
"one-way-to-do-it" instruction should be discouraged,
wherever it appears. Funding should leave room for a great
variety of learning materials, and expansion of faculty
perspectives in in-service programs.
Among the alternatives to the view I have advocated and
applied are several kinds of relativistic views. The closest of
those to my view is "Cultural Relativism." The beginning
premise of that perspective is: "Judgments are based on
experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual
in terms of his [her] enculturation" (Herskovits, 1956, p. 63).
The practice of tolerance supposedly follows from this state
of existence, because it provides no one a legitimate objective status from which culturally different persons may be
judged. "The very core of Cultural Relativism is the social
discipline that comes from respect for differences." (p. 77).
However, Cultural Relativism must stop short of really
developing an overt principle of tolerances such as my own.
This is because the relativist initially contended everyone is
limited to his or her cultural perspective. This puts the
relativist in logical difficulty. Herskovits, and other
exponents of the view, fail to explain just how anyone can
shed ethnocentrism to the point of respecting others if
everyone is always limited to cultural perspective (Sidney,
1954, p. 424). The tolerance at the end is certainly desirable,
even if kept a bit silent to mask a logical mess. One can
seriously question whether it could arise at all from the
prison of culture the cultural relativist initially posits.
Cultural Relativism also has practical and ethical
difficulties. Since it lacks an absolute principle of tolerance,
it really can't permit a person to deal on an intercultural level
enough to impose regulations for intercultural interactions.
Thus, if a given student were violent toward others in a class
due to his or her culture, an educator might well be in no
position to legitimately police the situation (Garcia, 1982, p.
9). Also, the cultural relativist would have little in his or her
position that could permit opposition to a culture-againstother-cultures, such as that of National Socialist Germany.
Relativism is extended even further by Existentialism. In
this perspective a given culture is even relinquished as a
proper basis for values. The individual alone creates values
by the serious choices that are made (Morris, 1966, p. 40).
If any individual can be right in terms of any choice he or
she really means to make, the possibility of anarchy in the
schools is even more hair-raising than it might be under
Cultural Relativism. There, at least the rules of given
cultures are binding upon their members. When rules are
real on an individual basis only, everybody doing everything
can be right!
Of course, such anarchy is impossible, even in the strange
event someone might desire to permit it by imposing
nothing at all upon students. When that person refuses to
tell students (or others) what to do, he or she forces them to
make decisions if anything at all is going to happen.
Individual freedom is imposed. No one can educate and
make no "waves" at all!
There is also a "mistaken" kind of Relativism. While he
lashed out at Idealists, Realists, and other traditional
philosophers for their dogmatism and held truth to be
relative to time and place, John Dewey (1957, pp. 114-117)

proposed a view of knowledge that was to structure the
changing content. This structure was essentially the steps
of the method of problem solving in experimental science. It
was to be applicable in all situations (1933). While Dewey's
content is relative, his method appears to be suspiciously
close to absolute status!
The imposition of experimental problem solving in school
is not really as liberating as Dewey's followers believed. The
Amish and other fundamental religious groups may have
difficulty applying the scientific method to all areas of life!
Most other kinds of ethnocentricism admit to absolutism.
The Classical Realist, Harry Broudy, clearly affirms that
educators need to have a more certain and fundamental
ground for aims for the good life than particular cultures. He
holds that there is a "natural" structure independent of
wishes, feelings, and desires; and that people can live
according to that structure as reason gives them a sure
grasp of its nature (Broudy, 1962, pp. 254-255). We are, in
brief, to become rational masters of ourselves and our
environments insofar as possible.
Though Broudy's formulation appears generously broad
at first, further examination of its ramifications reveals its
ethnocentric character. Technologies of peoples differ
considerably. Supposedly this would have something to do
with degrees to which the environment would be mastered.
Yet, is life in a higher technological society really better? It
seems stress is certainly lower in so-called "primitive"
societies. Is living longer always better? Is success always
desirable? (That would certainly be connected with
mastery.)
Older forms of Idealism also had elements of ethnocentrism. They tended to be gentler in degree of imposition
than realist positions,,- because they made much of mental
freedom and less of the natural environment. J. Donald
Butler provides an example of an Idealist kind of imposition
that is enthnocentric by first stating that absolute value is
derived from the Christian God, and then stating: "The
presupposition that ultimate values have their existence in
and of God does not imply that our possession of them is
automatic and without effort ... The individual only realizes
values as [she] he enters into them" (Butler, 1962, p. 200).
In other words, we are free to accept or reject the correct
ways, but there is a correct way.
Religious Idealists run the danger of imposing religion too
narrowly. Their views are truly broad enough to permit
efforts toward Christian unity, but they are not broad
enough for efforts toward religious unity. They are
ethnocentric in that they do not attain an intercultural level.
Idealists of several kinds have imposed individuality.
Immanuel Kant's formulation of the "categorical impera-

tive" (previously discussed) is an example of this.
Individualism has been a very strong theme in Western
cultures, particularly in European or Euro-American
cultures. This has not been so in the East, nor has it been so
in some communal groups of native Americans in the
United States. Individuality is far from an intercultural
concept. It is ethnocentric in character.
I believe my view, perhaps characterized well enough as
lntercultural Idealism, escapes ethnocentricity by advocating intercultural tolerance as its absolute principle. It also
escapes the logical difficulties and anarchy of various ~in~s
of Relativism. It simply declares that though we must live m
cultures, we have the power to reason beyond their
conflicts.
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There is a distinct advantage in being the last discussant.
It gives me the opportunity to point out that philosophy is a
continuous, long-range debate between ideas emanating
from different springboards of thought: springboards which
can never be reconciled completely. For example,
Democritus put forth a materialistic explanation of the world
which Plato contested, and then Aristotle challenged
Plato's view, and so on and on. The debate has waxed and
waned for 2,300 years and shows no signs of diminishing.
Numerous "isms" have been fostered. Some have been
trivial, and some have replenished the main streams of
thought.
The vantage point occupied by Realism is that of an
overview. It began as a kind of critique of other philosophies
and was not trapped into reducing everything into too
exclusive elements as several others were. Being later, it
profited from ideas and "mistakes" of other philosophies.
Of course, all philosophies have profited from the
long-range debate, correcting errors and deepening their
insights. But philosophical Realism claims it has an
advantage, because it starts from the assumption that one
cannot explain reality as just mental or material. Instead, it
first claims that there is a world of material things not
dependent for their existence on some mind being aware of
them and secondly, there are many abstract entities or
characteristics-signified, for example, by such terms as
"red," "bigger than," "justice," "home," etc. -which exist
whether minds know them or not (Breed, 1942, pp. 92-94).
For instance, even if no one had ever thought of roundness,
it would still exist in round things as long as there are objects
characterized in this way. Consequently, Realism does not
try to reduce everything to a mental or physical state, to the
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result of a transaction between an organism and its
environment, or to the process of existing.
According to this Realistic springboard, values exist as
such, and they are to be discovered, not made just for the
sake of human convenience .. Discovery depends upon the
independent nature of values and upon human powers of
reasoning. That is, values are discoverable in whole, or in
part, even if they do exist "out there," because they are not
isolated from experience, personality, and circumstances.
They are immanent in the activities of our daily lives and can
be revealed through a study of them. So, how do we
discover and study them?
We start by analyzing "value." Early philosophers did not
use this word but talked instead about good and bad, right
and wrong, beauty and ugliness, or art and artlessness.
Then the idea of value, meaning the worth of a thing, crept
in from the discipline of economics; and in the nineteenth
century, several philosophers argued that there is a
common ground shared by ethics and esthetics, as well as
by other aspects of life concerned with the worth of things.
Besides values connected to rightness or beauty, there are
religious, political, scientific, economic, and educational
values. Furthermore, words like good, right, virtue,
desirable, beauty, truth, honesty, and artistic can be
classified as value terms, for they denote what people want.
Words like bad, wrong, evil, undesirable, ugly, untrue,
dishonest, and artless are disvalue terms, for they denote
what people do not want. A value, then, is what we call an
experience that enhances life. A disvalue is an experience
that harms life.
This answers the question whether educators "should
impose values." (If that inflammatory word, "impose," had
not been used in the title of this series, my essay would be
easier to write; so, I shall ignore it temporarily.) Educators
are responsible for directing students to enhancements of
life and away from threats to life. The big question is: When
should such direction take place? What is the best time for
learning values? Should the time be guided by student
maturation, by an innate system among values themselves,
or by the advent of value-creating problem situations?
Realists believe all three approaches are needed, for they
complement each other. The maturation approach, which
gets support from the work of Jean Piaget (1952), means
that certain values are learned more easily at certain ages.
For example, even very _young children are aroused by
questions of fairness, older boys and girls are interested in
bravery, and adults debate temperance. The importance of
this approach hinges upon the fact that one's value
structure begins in infancy and continues throughout life as
part of one's intellectual and emotional development.
Humans probably spend more time in evaluating than in
any other intellectual enterprise. Since it is a pervasive and
life-long preoccupation, educators are well advised to
capitalize upon those values common to age groups. As

people grow older, their insights mature. Concepts of
fairness grow into concepts of justice, bravery into courage,
and endurance and temperance into self-control and
tolerance.
The second determinant of when is the value system
itself. Some people argue about a hierarchy-whether
ethical, esthetic, political, religious, and educational values
are related, and whether or not some values are more
important or fundamental. For instance, is honesty, beauty,
or money most important? You could say that under some
circumstances, honesty is most important, but under
different circumstances, beauty of money is most
important. However, if you say that values are relative to
situations, you raise the question of whether or not anything
is worth fighting or dying for. Is nothing so important that it
takes precedence over everything else, no matter what the
circumstances may be (Brandt, 1959)? On the other hand,
when someone says, "He is a diamond in the rough," the
implication is that some sterling characteristics, such as
courage and honesty, do overshadow lesser characteristics,
such as good manners and polite speech.
Consequently, some people contend that there is some
hierarchy and even a supreme value. This summum bonum,
it is claimed, is not subordinate to other goods or values; it is
something in which other goods are inclined or from which
they can be derived. Happiness, patriotism, and obedience
to the will of God have been some of the candidates for the
position of supreme value. However, Realists shy away
from such a reductionism, for they say a single highest
good can become dogmatism and obstruct other important
values-particularly when circumstances change. Happiness, for instance, can lead to shallow pleasure seeking;
patriotism has been used to stifle free speech and free
religious practices; and the will of God has sometimes been
interpreted by bigots. What is needed is some kind of
balancing in which important values complement each
other.
Since Realists equate values with life-sustaining and
life-enhancing, they emphasize health, economic selfsufficiency, harmonious social relationships, productive
knowledge and skills, beauty, and self-realization. One may
not be able to enjoy every one of these to its fullest extent all
of the time. In fact, one or more may be less than a person
desires; but if the others compensate for the slackening of
satisfaction, he or she can still be happy about the way
things are going. At any rate, there should be enough
worthy values and enough balance among them to sustain
and enhance life.
The third determinant of when values should be learned is
the occurrence of value-creating problems. Every-day life
forces us to make decisions concerning values. Parents start
applying rewards and punishments to infants; and as
children grow up, their brothers and sisters, playmates, and
schoolmates add to the pressures. More or less informally,
people participate in value decisions in the midst of family,
political, and business problem situations. If they are keen
observers, they notice one of the most puzzling characteristics of values; sometimes they are used as means, and
sometimes they serve as ends. A rising young politician may
work hard at being truthful and courageous in order to win
office. An actress may use her beauty and vivacity to charm
the public. On the other hand, truth may be an end in itself
to a scientist, and beauty may be an end in itself to a
painter.

Unlike truth and beauty, some things do not qualify as
ends in themselves. Money and power, for example, are
valuable (or disvaluable) as means but not a~ final ends.
They are valuable when used to raise standards of health
and literacy. They are disvaluable when used for destructive
purposes.
Now to get back to the word, "impose." Since some of
its synonyms are "require," "demand," and "force upon,"
it is normally taken to signify that one person or group
compels another person or group to accept something.
Since we have already pointed out that educators are
responsible for directing students toward what enhances life
and away from what threatens life, there is no doubt that
school systems, like parents, do in fact impose certain
values upon students. These ought to be health, economic
self-sufficiency, harmonious social relationships, productive
knowledge and skills, beauty, and self-realization (achieving
one's potential in some worthy ideal) . Some of these are
embodied formally in school curricula. That is, several
school subjects deal directly or indirectly with matters of
health, economic self-sufficiency, and harmonious social
relationships. The others do not always get as much
attention, but they are not completly overlooked. A school
that does not at least pay lip service to all these values (or
values similar to them) would be hard to find. If they take
their jobs seriously, school personnel discuss such values
periodically and incorporate them into their stated
objectives and aims.
These are professional values-goods clothed in educational objectives and aims-which schools publicize as
their reasons for being. But we should also consider sets of
values that originate in disciplines, as well as in individuals.
These two value-sets sometimes create highly visible
controversies.
Most disciplines have one or more topics which clash with
common sense or with values upheld by some portions of
the public. Today, for example, teachers of the life sciences
are troubled by the evolution versus creation conflict.
Historians and political scientists may wonder about some
aspects of our national development and of the capitalist
system. If they wonder too audibly, they may be called
communists or fascists. Teachers of literature must be
careful not to teach "immoral" stories or poems. There is
nothing new about all of this. Scholarly and scientific
investigations have challenged conventional wisdom and
popular opinion for centuries, sometimes with dramatic
results. Socrates was executed for "corrupting the morals
of youth;" Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for
challenging church doctrine; and John T. Scopes of
Tennessee was fired (dismissed from his job, I mean) for
teaching the theory of evolution.
These controversies hinge upon interpretations of
morality and truth . On the one side, common sense and
conventional wisdom say: "This is the way things are or
should be." On the other side, scholarly and scientific
investigators say: "Disciplined inquiry has resulted in a
consensus of those who are best informed that this is the
way things are or should be." Of course, some disputes are
more wars of words than of basic principles. Differences
may result, at least in part, from misunderstood terms and
confused definitions. When, however, the dispute hinges
upon unreconcilable principles, the Realist calms himself or
herself with the knowledge that although truth doesn't
always triumph, it has an advantage over untruth; truth will
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keep "popping up" as different people in different places
and times keep on discovering and rediscovering it (Mill,
1947). Eventually, it will wear out the opposition, for truth is
that characteristic of a statement which makes it depict
reality.
The "moral" aspects of these disciplinary controversies
are made more difficult to resolve, because they are usually
judged within the context of social standards which can
change rapidly. Today, morality is most often associated
with sex. This is a narrowed application, for morals embrace
all kinds of behavior between people. (One cannot be moral
or immoral to one's self, to nature, or to God, although one
can be harmful or irreverent to these.) Thus, moral behavior
does not harm social relations. Immoral behavior does.
The other value-set is personal and private-the value
systems of individual teachers, counselors, and administrators. When can these people impose their own concepts of
what is good and worthy upon students and their
professional colleagues? If their private values coincide with
professional and disciplinary values, there is little to worry
about. However, this is not always the case. Fortunately,
some professional educational organizations offer some
assistance and advice in this matter. The National Education
Association publishes a code of ethics for teachers in its
annual NEA Handbook for Teachers; there is also a code of
ethics for administrators in the AASA Code of Ethics (1966),
and one for counselors in the Personnel and Guidance
Journal ( 1971). All three codes lay down regulations for the
behaviors of practitioners toward students, colleagues, and
the public. While they evade questions of imposition by
talking about democratic procedures, the implication is that
the pressures of majority opinion do impose values. This is
the most widely accepted answer to the questions of
whether or not imposition is desirable.
However, it does not really answer questions of when it is
desirable to impose one's own values. And I am not sure
that there is one final answer. This must be the reason
several discussants were asked to respond to the topic. Still,
the Realist concludes that his is the best current answer.
Those people who contend that people instinctively
resent imposition-therefore, it is impossible-ignore two
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facts. One is that imposition is not necessarily.a harsh force.
It can be gentle, inconspicuous, and tactful. What it means
for education is persistent presentation adapted to the
abilities of the recipient. The other fact is that imposition is a
fact of life. Society, family life, and government constantly
impose. All of us receive weather changes, taxes, war,
laws, and behavior patterns, whether we want to receive
them or not. Learning to adjust to unavoidable impositions
is one of the most important lessons of life.
Those philosophers who try to substitute democratic
and problem-solving processes for imposition are attempting something of a coverup. When democratic and
problem-solving processes for imposition are interpreted to
mean that students, teachers, counselors, and administrators should participate equally in learning, another
important fact is ignored. The only equal starting place for
all of us is ignorance. But civilizations need several
thousands of years to develop. Such an interpretation
would put every generation back into the position of the
cave man; each would have to re-invent the wheel. Since
wheels are easier to re-invent than our present value
system, the advocates of this position have been forced to
modify their philosophy. Instead of trying to re-invent, they
advocate that we re-discover the ideas of Plato, Aristotle,
Kant, Mill, and others who have thought deeply about
values. What is this but a kind of imposition?
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PART II: CRITIQUES
A Realistic Critique
F. R. McKenna
Dr. Sutton said a liberating education may impose the
values of cultural competence and intercultural tolerance
upon students. This is a generous view insofar as it respects
cultural differences. It is a liberating one if one of the
cultural "competencies" is not to hate other cultures. And I
am sure he is right in maintaining that everyone needs to
feel comfortable within some culture, and that intercultural
tolerance is important to civilized life.
Furthermore, I agree that adults, particularly parents and
teachers, must impose some values on children. As he said,
some values must be imposed in order to provide a structure
for freedom. The main question, then, is "which values?"
He chose cultural competence and intercultural tolerance.
He might have chosen more specific values such as
business success, patriotism, religious hegemony, or
improved health standards-all of which could be part of
the cultural framework of some society. Instead, he chose
much more generalized values to impose.
The generality is a problem. Dr. Sutton knows that some
cultures are not worth emulating; after all, he deplored the
culture of National Socialist Germany and he knows all
cultures have some features that are better left untaught.
And he must know that some people renounce the cultures
into which they are born in order to move into other
cultures, because these are judged to be better.
In other words, don't we all know that some cultures are
superior and some are inferior? Should we be tolerant of a
culture in which violence and deceit are admired modes of
behavior? Even though Dr. Sutton did condemn the
National Socialist regime, he concludes his essay by
advocating intercultural tolerance as an absolute principle.
So, I cannot resist asking if he would tolerate a culture
which is intolerant of all other cultures.
I do not think it would do him any good to argue, as he
did in his conclusion, that "though we must live in cultures,
we have the power to reason beyond their conflicts." His
statement needs clarification. If it means that by powers of
reason we can live without cultural conflicts in a world of
cultural conflicts, he is contradicting himself.
Dr. Stuart provided us with clear and useful applications
of a general principle he derived from Kant's moral
philosophy: our actions should be such as to respect others
as free and rational beings; to treat others as ends and not
merely as means to our own ends. He chose to answer the
question about imposing values, which was assigned to all
of us, by falling back upon a maxim for regulating thought
about our actions rather than resorting to rules for
regulating actions of themselves. This was a wise decision.
Had he chosen one or more rules for actions such as, do not
kill; do not steal; be loving; be frugal; etc. , he would have
been forced to note all of the exceptions to the rule, the

conditions under which the rule would apply, and end up
negating his reasons for imposing values.
That is, if he had taken up such a rule as "Do not kill," he
would have become involved in such issues as warfare,
abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and self defense. By the time
all of the reasons for and against all kinds of killings had
been explored, the result would have been a mass of
contradictions. Even if less drastic acts were singled out to
be ruled for and against, such as loving and punctuality, the
number of contradictions would be more confusing than
helpful. So he was wise in choosing a fundamental maxim
for guiding thinking about all kinds of rules for behavior.
This is especially necessary when we narrow kinds of
behavior down to those we normally consider moral or
immoral. These behaviors are those interactions and
transactions between people which enhance or threaten life
and well-being. Such actions may be overt or covert,
corporeal or linguistic; they may evoke mental and/or
physical feelings, and involve few or many people. And
when we specify professional, as well as personal moral
behaviors, we add to the numbers and diversity of
prescribings.
Reference to professional behaviors brings up a matter
obscured by the original question to which we discussants
are responding. The question focuses attention upon how
we as teachers, counselors, and administrators behave
toward students. What are the effects upon students when
we impose our values? We also ought to think about the
effects upon us.
Dr. Stuart, for example, discussed effects upon a high
school class when three students were disruptive and upon
Mary when her counselor imposed values without giving
Mary opportunity to choose. Probably, he did so because he
followed so carefully his principle to respect others as free
and rational beings. But in doing so, he said nothing about
self respect, which is part of Kant's original maxim. Kant
said, "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always as an end, never
as merely a means." Not only should we not use others just
as means, but we should not allow others to use us in a like
manner.
The young high school teacher with the discipline
problem was lacking in self-respect when he permitted the
three noisy students to damage his work as an instructor.
He should have respected his own duty enough to prevent
its disruption. Likewise, Ms. Watson should respect herself
as a counselor, the position she was hired to fill, and
perform as one in providing information from which Mary
could make a choice. When she put her anti-abortion
feelings ahead of her advisory duties, Ms. Watson was
disrespectful to herself as a counselor.
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The advantage of Kant's maxim over Dr. Stuart's version
is that of double protection. Each of us is responsible for
treating other people as ends, and each of us is responsible
for other people treating us as ends. If the other people
neglect their obligation to us, it is our duty to see that we
still are treated as ends.
Explanations of how Existentialism works fascinate me,
even though I remain unconverted. Dr. Barger minced no
words when he said values cannot be imposed, because
only the individual can determine what his or her good is;
therefore, only the individual can know what values will best
serve that good. In a sense he supplied what I criticized Dr.
Stuart for omitting, the individual's responsibility to himself;
every mature person is first of all accountable for his or her
own actions. This is a refreshing view in an era accustomed
to blaming parents, society, depressions, uncontrollable
passions, etc. as the reasons one acts as one does.
Determinism, Existentialists say, may be the basic fabric of
the physical universe, but not of man. Humans can choose.
Pragmatists also emphasize the ability to choose but,
according to Dr. Barger, they are not the rugged
individualists that Existentialists are. For when questions of
value come up, Pragmatists appeal to consensus, whereas
Existentialists appeal to individual judgment. That is,
Pragmatists believe that values are social agreements,
because the individual is basically part of the group.
Existentialists, on the other hand, believe that values are
personal decisions, because the group is basically an
assembly of individuals.
These two points of view-the individual is basically part
of the group versus the group is basically an assembly of
individuals-oversimplify a complex proposition. Presumably, "group" means some individuals who interact
sufficiently to be indentified as interacting. Pragmatists
emphasize the group aspect, Existentialists emphasize the
individual aspect; but Realists emphasize the interacting
which is to say that interactions are of the group and of the
individual. Also, say the Realists, interactions are between
humans and non-human aspects of the environment. So,
values derive from investigating the worth to existence of all
kinds of interactions. Contrary to Existentialists' thinking,
humans do not create values; they only contribute to
creating some of them.,_
But while I think highly of Existentialism for sensitizing the
rest of us to the ideas that existence precedes essence, that
loneliness is a fact of life with which we must live, and that
humans are primarily responsible for themselves, I cannot
buy the idea that viewpoints are basically matters of faith or
belief. This latter idea may be suggested by Heisenberg's
"Uncertainty Principle," but it is not supported by the
principle. Heisenberg said it is impossible to measure the
position and velocity of a particle simultaneously with more
than strictly limited precision. This principle of atomic
physics may suggest that an observer in a paradigm can
never be completely objective in his observations, because
he is never outside his paradigm. But does it apply outside
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of the physical sciences? Even if it should work elsewhere,
does it make all observations subjective and relative? No
Realist would agree. There is enough permanency,
sameness, and stability in the universe to be experienced
alike by humans and to be expressed objectively. One proof
of this is the fact that we can talk together about many
things.
Finally, I wish to compare my thinking with that of the
other discussants. I notice that they started their essays
with their versions of the stimulant question, and two of
them immediately answered it. I quote them: "The view that
some values should be imposed for freedom's sake might
seem to be a contradiction."; "When should one, as an
educator, impose his or her values upon students, clients, or
staff members?"; "The question, 'What values should be
imposed on a person for his/her own good?' can be
answered quite simple: none at all!". Dr. Sutton said some
values should be imposed. Dr. Stuart asked when should
values be imposed. Dr. Barger said no values can be
imposed. I did not start coping with whether and when until
I was nearly one-quarter of the way into my essay.
As one reads each essay, it becomes apparent that every
discussant understands the question somewhat differently.
Was that because the question was not framed clearly, or
because each of us brought a different viewpoint to his
reading of it, or was it both of these? I want to expatiate a
little on both possibilities but especially on the different
viewpoints brought to bear upon the question.
Although I profited from reading and criticizing the other
essays, I wonder why more attention was not given to
discussing what values really are, to the difference between
"should" and "could," and to the several meanings of
"impose." More investigation of these might have clarified
the question, and we might have agreed upon the scope of
imposition which is certainly a key concept.
It is tradional to compare philosophical differences by
contrasting their metaphysical bases or their results.
However, I want to resort to the opening statement of my
essay. Historically, all viewpoints profit from the continuing
debate, which is what philosophy really is. Terms and
concepts are improved, some excesses are toned down,
and some spark new lines of thought. Ideas are tested by
being put to work. All viewpoints profit from the historical
process; but in different ways. In a sense, Realism is the
historical process. It is not a kind of Naturalism brought up
to date, nor is it any more of an ancestor of Pragmatism
than Idealism. But it is the position, beginning with
Aristotle, that we cannot reduce explanations of the
universe to overemphasize one dimension, such as mind,
matter, experience, or existence. The universe is all of these
and more.
So, when Realists talk about values and disvalues they
say that some are created, some are inherited, and some are
discovered. Some are imposed, some are freely acquired,
and some are rejected. The big question is how we may
learn to distinguish between worthy and unworthy values.

Defense of an lntercultural Perspective
Kenneth Sutton
Dr. Barger's view is very much at home in our pluralistic
world. His willingness to see needs from other people's
perspectives is commendable.
His individualism also could find a home in some of the
more dominant cultures in this country. Freedom to choose
and responsiblity for choices made are familiar themes in the
lives of many. This means Dr. Barger's thoughts have
enormous clarifying potential.
Yet, this same individualism can amount to an
ethnocentric imposition whenever it is applied in communal
societies. (There are some of these in the United States.)
For instance, some Pueblo peoples of the Southwest are
much more inclined to form a self concept around
membership in an extended family or clan group than are
Euroamericans and Black Americans . They are also less
motivated by individual competition and tend to ascribe less
personal responsibility for actions.
Contrary to what seems implicit in his view, individuals
are not more fundamental than cultures in any objective
sense. Humans are helpless at birth, and must be
maintained in terms of a given way of life. They are never
able to function apart from cultural contexts. A particular
culture can be transcended only by gaining an intercultural
perspective. This, however, is not an achievement of some
splendid independence from the cultural factor as much as it
is a broadening of cultural participation.
Also, Dr. Barger's Existentialism provides little basis for
the prevention of anarchy in the schools and elsewhere. If
really meaning a choice makes it right, and two students
meant to fight each other, he couldn't do much to stop it
without violating his intention to extend the right of free
decision . The students could stop the fight with new, free
decisions. Thus, the best Dr. Barger could do would be to
remind each at the point of onslaught that he or she is
personally responsible for whatever happens. This doesn't
work very often when student commitment is intense.
I believe my views offer more true freedom than
Existentialism, providing for overt control in cases of
conflict. At the same t ime, they, are not as suspect-by
virtue of their intercultural perspective-of being ethnocentric.
Dr. Stuart is willing to intervene between, correct, or
even to dispute with students and others as long as he truly
maintains respect for their subject status or personhood.
This is a position conducive to a sane, well-balanced
educational process.
He draws, as I do, from the rational ethics of Immanuel
Kant. I concur with him that this approach has fewer
disadvantages than others, generally at least.
However, Dr. Stuart thought it best to leave Kant's
statement of the general ethical principle (categorical
imperative) alone. I revised it.
If we only sought to treat everyone as subjects rather than
objects as Kant and Stuart suggest, individualistic societies
would be served; but those in communal societies would
not view the practice as a great favor. Also, one must
consider societies of an extreme pragmatic inclination

where just about everything is a means rather than an end in
itself.
I am more than suggesting that the act of honoring the
subject status of everyone cannot be willed for all peoples. It
is too ethnocentric to be a general ethical principle or
categorical imperative. I submit that my intercultural
tolerance is more inclusive and, thus, more nearly merits the
general ethical principle designation.
I am pleased with the avoidance of extremes in Dr.
McKenna's type of Realism. Some of the "new" or
"scientific" versions of that philosophy come very close to
reducing everything to the physical. By comparison, Dr.
McKenna gains greater balance, more ability to use aspects
of philosophies other than Realism, and a greater generosity
toward variety.
I agree with him that freedom requires a structure, certain
enforced limits; but I think we disagree to some extent
concerning where to draw the boundaries of freedom's
structure. He emphasizes imposition of that which is life
sustaining and life enhancing. I stress competence within
given cultures and tolerance between cultures as the areas
where values can be imposed.
While it seems to me our positions have many areas of
potential agreement, there could be points of significant
conflict. Some cultures do not sustain life as well as others,
due to the type of medicine they practice or their religious
beliefs. There are also cultures that do not emphasize
material security and attainment as much as others. Dr.
McKenna equates values with the sustaining and enhancement of life. On the basis of this, it seems he would alter
such cultures. I hold that the cultures are as legitimate as
others as far as anyone can know or demonstrate, and I
would interact with them on their terms.
We cannot fairly judge a culture from the outside. Is it
really better to sustain life in all circumstances? It appears to
me that we can protect ourselves to the point where life is
hardly worth living, but this will vary according to cultural
perspectives.
Also, there is a great deal of difference between cultures
on the subject of life enhancement. Some, such as Zen
Buddhists, do not seek to enhance life at all. They simply let
it be. It is not difficult to imagine that they may be wise to do
so; but, again, wisdom varies from culture to culture.
Though Dr. McKenna prudently permits imposition of
values on broad bases, I do not believe them broad enough
to avoid occasions of ethnocentricity. I can't see the
demonstration of the objectivity of his central values.
Cultures can be judged from an intercultural perspective.
Anyone who has enjoyed a breadth of cultural participation
to permit holding values of intercultural tolerance can clearly
see the wrong when cultures fail to tolerate each other. And
this is not, by its very definition, a judgment that is walled in
by a specific cultural boundary.
The value of competence within given cultures is mainly
of transitional importance. All of us must begin our lives in
terms of specific cultures. As we gain competence in these
terms, we gradually mature to the point of intercultural life.
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It is then that the higher value of intercultural tolerance
becomes possible to us.
Generally, my views may be distinguished from those of
the other authors by breadth of perspective. The breadth of
my views even permits me to utilize the perspectives of my
co-authors.
The individualism of Existentialism and respect for
persons in Kantian Idealism certainly hold values palatable
to many cultures, including my own. Realism, with its
emphasis upon objective values built upon the foundation of
that which sustains and enhances life also has broad cultural
application.
I have long been interested in how different ways of
looking at things have persisted through the centuries and

how none has really vanquished the others. Could each
have "homes" and support in different cultures?
I have also been interested for a long time in what people
call the "philosophical attitude." At this point, the readers
are quite aware of clashes between the authors of this
edition. They may not know that all of this is going on in the
best of humor and friendship. Seeking the truth involves a
struggle, but seekers of truth have reason to respect each
other. It is usually the way of those who deal with
philosophy. I -wish it could be the way of interaction
between cultures. I would be proud if we who educate
others could have significant roles in bringing it about.

In Defense of Individual Relativism
Robert Newton Barger
Professor Stuart, in his article, bases his approach to the
question of imposition of values on Immanuel Kant's
principle that we should always treat others as ends and
never as means. Stated in this basic form, Kant's principle
fits in quite well with the Existentialistic approach that I have
advocated. This is because the true Existentialist is not only
concerned with himself or herself. The true Existentialist
understands that each person is an autonomous human
being, and therefore, each person is entitled to the kind of
autonomous decision-making process that the Existentialist
claims for himself or herself. Kant's principle, then,
comports well with the Existentialist notion that one should
never impose on another's freedom by forcing someone to
accept a given view of reality, truth, or value. I agree with
Professor Stuart that this does not mean that a person
should never intervene in the actions of another. If an
Existentialist were to intervene in another person's actions
in order to insure the Existentialist's or a third party's
freedom to choose personal reality, truth, or value, this
intervention should not properly be called an "imposition of
values" on that person. In fact, what the Existentialist
would be doing by this intervention would be preventing the
imposition of values.
I do have one area of disagreement with Professor
Stuart's position. From the standpoint of his Kantian
analysis, Professor Stuart sees the person as essentially one
who has the ability to think. Hence, he sees the trait of
rationality as the essential human characteristic. However,
the Existentialist would not define a person so primarily in
terms of mind. Freedom, according to the Existentialist,
does involve room for consideration of desires and
inclinations, in addition to more "rational" considerations,
when it is time for choices to be made. The human person is
a creature of emotionality, as well as of rationality.
Professor Stuart's position is, thus, a bit too idealistic to
elicit total approval from an Existentialist.
Professor Sutton, in his article, has begun the formulation
of a position that promises to break new ground in the field
of moral philosophy. This kind of pioneering work is a task
too seldom undertaken today. He is to be commended for
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using this forum to sketch out his original ideas. While I will
be forced to take serious exception to some of these ideas, I
do so with profound respect for the creative endeavor that
he has begun here and with the hope that my criticisms may
be of assistance in carrying forward further work on this
theory.
I am in agreement with Professor Sutton's stress on the
general principle of tolerance, as should be evident from my
previous comments on Professor Stuart's article. My first
problem, however, concerns Professor Sutton's reference
to the absoluteness of the principle of tolerance only in
regard to "intercultural" tolerance. I would think, if the
principle of tolerance is to be absolute, that it must apply at
all times and in all sitt.:ations and, thus, must include
relations between persons and not only relations between
cultures. Is it not too limiting to speak of an absolute
principle of intercultural tolerance? Think, for instance, of a
culture which might hold individual autonomy as its highest
value. Tolerating such a culture in accord with the
above-mentioned principle would thereby involve tolerating
individual autonomy, and thus, the principle would broaden
out to an absolute principle of tolerance without being
limited only to intercultural tolerance.
My second problem is that Professor Sutton's position
seems to make culture absolute, at least in the early stages
of the child's development. If this is the case, his theory falls
subject to the criticism of Ethical Relativism which Professor
Stuart has so well put forward in his article. Also associated
with this problem is the question of the role of subcultures.
Is it just cultures that are to be tolerated, and not
subcultures, too? If so, where is one to draw the line
between the two?
My third problem is a practical, rather than theoretical,
one. Why is education to be monocultural in elementary
schools and multicultural in secondary schools? Even given
Professor Sutton's theory, cannot the appreciation of other
cultures properly begin in elementary school at the same
time that one is gaining a sense of identity with one's own
culture?
My last problem is the most serious one. Why are

individuals within a culture expected to conform to the
culture, while cultures are not expected to conform to any
super-cultural norm? The answer would seem to be that
Professor Sutton regards cultures, rather than individuals,
as the primary units of society. On the basic question
regarding this point: whether a group is to be defined in
terms of its constituent individuals or whether the individual
is to be defined in terms of the group of which he or she is a
part, Professor Sutton comes down on the side of the group
as being the basic element of definition. I know this, in fact,
to be his position from personal discussions that I have had
with him . This position explains his belief, stated near the
end of his article, that individuality is ethnocentric in
character. This is only the case, however, if one adopts
Professor Sutton 's view that the group is more primary than
is the individual, a view to which an Existentialist would not,
of course, adhere.
I would like to respond to Professor Sutton's concern that
the practice of Existentialism in a school might result in
anarchy. Anarchy is not a necessary result of Existentialism.
As I indicated in commenting on Professor Stuart's article,
intervention might be practiced by an Existentialist, on
occasion, for the sake of protecting another person's
freedom. In this regard, the maintenance of a learning
atmosphere in a classroom would not be antithetical to an
Existentialist stance . As I also mentioned, the forcing of
people to choose their own values should not properly be
referred to as "imposing values."
Finally, although I regard the Existentialist positi6'h as
preferable to Professor Sutton's lntercultural Idealism
because of Existentialism's regard for the autonomy of the
individual , I want to conclude my remarks by wondering if
there are not potential grounds for a compromise between
Professor Sutton's position and my own. Although he sees
the group as primary and I see the individual as primary, we
may both be wrong. Stated more positively, we may both
be only partially correct . Consider, for example, the
possibility that the individual and the group might be equally
important . Unfortunately, the pursuit of this possibility
would take us beyond the scope of the present project.
Professor McKenna states in his article that Realism is an
overview that is not trapped into reducing everything to two

exclusive elements . He is, in my view, quite correct in
pointing out the superiority of the comprehensive Realistic
view over a number of more simplistic philosophica!
outlooks. Despite its sophisticated stature, however, an
Existentialist must register an objection to the Realist
outlook . The Existentialist must simply deny that values
exist objectively in things and are there waiting to be
discovered. Consider, for example, Professor McKenna's
definition of a value as " an experience that enhances life"
and a disvalue as "an experience that harms life ." The
Existentialist would comment that those things which serve
as enhancements to life or threats to life must be decided
upon by each individual person, because the meaning of
"life" must be defined by each individual person and,
therefore, will be different for each individual person. Thus,
something is only a value or a disvalue if it is chosen as such
by a given individual. Contrary to the Realist outlook, a
thing has no " value" in itself and does not become a value
until it is chosen as such by a given individual. A Realist
world of objective pre-defined values may seem like an
easier world in which to make decisions, because what is
"good" and what is "bad" already exist as such. Choices
can, therefore, be based on objective knowledge.
Unfortunately, according to the Existentialist, that is not the
way the world is .
To sum up, the Existentialist could agree with the
principle of treating others as ends rather than means but
would find the Idealist emphasis on rationality in connection
with this principle to be somewhat incomplete. The
Existentialist could also agree with the principle of tolerance
put forward by lntercultural Idealism but would object to
limiting it only to intercultural tolerance. Finally, while
recognizing the synthetic achievements of Realism, the
Existentialist would disagree with its definition of values as
fixed and objective. In short, one cannot lean solely on
reason , society, or the spiritual / material world in order to
discover values. One must individually create them. To hand
over one's freedom and allow imposition from any other
source would be to side with the heretical views of
Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor.

Relativist, Existentialist, and Realist Views
on Imposing Values: A Critique
James D. Stuart
Professor Sutton begins his paper admirably with the
insight that imposing values cannot be avoided. The
controlling question, then, is not whether we should ever
impose values, but what sorts of values should be imposed
and under what circumstances is such imposition justified.
If we lived in a world of perfectly rational and moral human
beings, there would be no need for values to be imposed. In
such a world, everyone would pursue only rational and

moral ends, and more importantly, there )IVOuld never be a
conflict between persons and their ends. In an ideal world of
this sort, there could exist absolute freedom, since there
would be no need for laws which restrict freedom. In the
real world of less than perfect human beings, however, such
absolute freedom is sheer illusion.
The contention that we must have laws which restrict our
freedom in order to maximize our freedom is, of course,
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paradoxical. Yet, the recognition that laws governing the
behavior of human beings must exist and be generally
obeyed, if we are to be free, forms the basis for the
justification of forming civil societies. In John Locke's
version of the social contract theory, for example, the claim
is that this is why one would choose to leave the state of
nature in which there are no laws or powers to enforce them
and enter into a society where such laws exist. According to
this view, freedom exists to a greater extent in society than
in the state of nature, even though its laws are imposed
upon those living in society .
Professor Sutton's position on imposing values, as I
understand it, does not exactly reflect Locke's social
contract view, but it is similar. Both views recognize the
truth of the paradox of freedom; some freedom must be
sacrificed if freedom is to exist. The basic difference is that
he talks about imposing values for the good of the person.
Here, unlike Locke's social contract justification for
imposing values, there is supposed to be a direct benefit to
the person upon whom the values are imposed instead of an
indirect benefit derived from others being restrained from
interfering with one's goals.
In Sutton's view, persons have certain limitations if they
are not competent in their cultures, and the job of the
educator is to remove that incompetence, even if that
involves imposing values on them. This is justified, he
insists, because cultural incompetence entails limitations,
and if a person has limitations, he or she is not really free.
Thus, the ultimate justification for the imposition of values is
an increase in the total freedom of the individual upon
whom the values are being imposed.
This suggests that Professor Sutton might be advocating
imposing the competencies of a person's cultures on an
individual even if that person's sub-culture does not value
such competencies. This possiblity can be illustrated as
follows: Suppose that there is a minority student whose
sub-culture does not value just those competencies which ,
in the opinion of the educator, are required to succeed in the
larger culture of that student. Sutton appears to be saying
that the educator is justified in imposing those values which
are necessary for attaining cultural competence . Yet, he
rejects "cultural chauvinism," . which makes me hesitant
about attributing such a view to him. So, we may ask, is the
educator justified in imposing the values of cultural
competence in this case or not? If not, it looks as if there will
be many cases in which cultural competence cannot be the
goal of the educator. If the educator is justified in imposing
t hese values, even though they are not valued by the
individual's sub-culture, how is "cultural chauvinism " to be
avoided?
In the final analysis, I think Professor Sutton's
justification for imposing va lues reflects the social contract
justification as employed by Rousseau , rather than as
employed by Locke. Locke saw the justification in terms of
t he laws of society providing for one person 's protection
from others and in terms of providing for an impartial way of
settling disputes. Rousseau, in contrast, speaks of being
" forced to be free." In other words, he speaks of being
forced to do things, because they are good for you, even
though one might not want to do them. Sutton's contention
that the educator is justified in imposing the values of
cultural competence in order to bring about freedom
reminds one of Rousseau , rather than Locke. This involves a
much deeper paradox of freedom if it is really freedom at all.
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In contrast to Professor Sutton's answer, Professor
Barger answers the question, "When should values be
imposed?" by denying the assumption implicit in the
question. That is, he denies that any values should ever be
imposed. Arguing from an Existentialist perspective, he
claims that imposing values from without cannot be for the
person's own good and, therefore, values should never be
imposed.
Professor Barger's worry about imposing values is
certainly a significant one and one which must be dealt with
in any position that favors the imposition of values. If
individuals act in certain ways only because they are
required to, and especially if they have strong aversion to
such acts, they are not likely to become authentic persons.
Authentic persons are those who act according to their own
desires rather than acting from the desires of others. It is
perhaps appropriate to point out that much, if not all, of this
insight is captured in Kant's principle that we should treat
individuals as persons and not things. Part of what that
involves is that we should take into account the desires of
others in our treatment of them and should not treat them
as mere objects.
The major difference between the Existentialist and
Kantian accounts is that in the latter's view the restriction
concerning the imposition of values is not absolute. That is,
in general, I am to refrain from ignoring the desires of others
and imposing my values upon them. This is demanded by
my recognition of others as persons and not things.
However, there are times, Kant would argue, when certain
values must be imposed upon others. If someone, for
instance, is about to act out his or her desires to do serious
bodily harm to another individual, then that person's desires
should be interfered with. In other words, values contrary
to those held by the person about to harm another ought to
be imposed, and this is true even if it means the person
whose desires are being thwarted becomes less authentic
than he or she might otherwise have been. On the Kantian
view, what justifies interfering with the freedom of the
assailant is that we are acting to prevent an intrusion on
another person's freedom.
Professor Barger points out that Existentialists do not
believe that there is a "Grand Plan of Goodness," but values
are created by individuals through the choices they make.
Since the individual chooses his or her own values, and
there is no "Grand Plan," values should not be imposed.
But the question of whether values should be imposed does
not depend completely upon whether there is a set of
" correct" values to which each of us ought to be subject.
For, even if such values did exist, it could still be argued that
they should not be imposed . Rather, it could be held that
each person should be allowed to discover such values
alone. Conversely, even if there is no " Grand Plan of
Goodness," as maintained by the Existentialists, one could
still argue that some values should be imposed.
I claimed earlier that one cannot totally avoid imposing
values and, therefore, the important question is what values
should be imposed and under what circumstances. Given
that values must be imposed, we ought to take seriously
Professor Barger's worry concerning the potential damage
this could do to the individual and attempt to avoid an
imposition of values which might involve a person having to
deny his or her own values and identity.
Professor McKenna agrees that it is impossible fQr an
educator to completely avoid imposing values. Thus, again,

the question is, "How do we identify the values which
should be imposed and the proper circumstances which call
for their imposition?" It should be noted that, unlike
professors Sutton and Barger, McKenna believes that a
correct set of values exists and is, moreover, optimistic
about our ability to finally discover them.
How do we determine the correct values for imposition?
McKenna's answer is both direct and, I think, unsatisfactory. If the educator selects professional and disciplinary
values for imposition, McKenna assures us, there is little to
worry about. "The imposition is right." He refers us to the
National Education Association code for teachers and
mentions that there are similar codes for administrators and
counselors. McKenna admits that he has no answer to the
question of when values should be imposed.
Although professional codes may be quite adequate in
spelling out a desirable set of educational values, it does not
follow that they should be imposed. It may be that some or
all of these values should be goals without it ever being the
case that they should be imposed on others. Professional
codes, then, are not adequate guides regarding what values

are to be imposed. Also, as we have seen, Professor
Mc Kenna agrees that they do not tell us when values should
be imposed. Therefore, unless one is willing to assume that
professional codes articulate the correct values and that all
of these should be imposed, one cannot accept this view as
an adequate answer to the question of values imposition . In
any case, we would want to know why a · certain set of
values is the right one, and the fact that they are listed in an
official code is hardly an adequate answer to this question.
After seriously considering each of the above alternatives
to the Kantian position, I remain convinced, largely for the
reasons just given, that Kantianism offers the best
guidance to the question of value imposition . This should
not be taken to imply that I believe that there are no
difficulties with the Kantian view. Nevertheless, the
principle that we should always treat others as ends or
persons and not merely as a means, when correctly
understood, provides a useful criterion for determining what
values may be imposed and when it is permissible for them
to be imposed . I find the alternative positions less helpful in
dealing with either one or both of these issues.

ESTRANGED PROFESSORIATES
Probably all of us are aware to some extent of the recent criticism of our nation's schools, their teachers, and the institutions which prepare those teachers . The
discontent runs deep and the quality of American education has become a key national issue. The year 1983 has been dubbed as " the year of the study." You have
heard of the report, " A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform." It is only one of at least five current, major task force reports dealing with education. The
pace of such deliberations at the state level also is quickening and decisions are in the offing that will impact upon teacher preparation programs. Hopefully, we will have
an opportunity to influence those decisions. The following "gem" is excerpted from "Teacher education in 1983: an overview," Basic Education, May, 1983.

We have yet to meet a teacher educator who does not affirm the
importance of subject mastery. In February, the American
Association of Colleges for Teacher Education published "Profile
of a Beginning Teacher," outlining "the knowledge and skills that
should be quaranteed by graduation from a teacher education
program." The profile makes clear, "it is the professional studies
component that transforms the educated individual into a
professional teacher," and goes on to devote six pages to that
matter, half of them given to "generic and specialized pedagogical
knowledge and skills." Where their treasure is, there will be the
hearts of teacher educators.
And where will be the treasure and hearts of those masters of
subjects, the professors of arts and sciences? For the most part,
their treasure has been in their subjects, their hearts not much in
the training of schoolteachers, and there is little to suggest that
they will have a change of heart.
Of course there are outstanding exceptions. Just as there always
have been professors of education whose interest in the substance
of schoolteaching is more than perfunctory, so there have been
and are doctors of philosophy dedicated to the task of preparing
teachers. It is because they are exceptions that they stand out,
however.
It is our persuasion that a central failure of teacher education has
been the lack of collaboration on the parts of the doctors of
philosophy and the doctors of education. John R. Palmer is not so
persuaded. Dr. Palmer is dean of the School of Education at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, where "more faculty across the
campus are coming to us wanting to get involved in teacher
education ."

If university faculty members across the country wanted to get
involved in teacher education, we could share Dean Palmer's hope
that able students may be more inclined to consider teaching as a
career.
Describing teacher education as "a weak chain with a few
strong links," David Stewart of the English Department at Texas A
& M University proposes "shifting teacher education to the
academic disciplines" and so "forge a new chain that would retain
the strong links of the old by including them in discipline-based
programs." Responding, Dean Robert Stout of the College of
Education at Arizona State University wraps up the dialogue with
this:
"Let teachers of college English teach structure, function, and
meaning of language. Let them teach collegians how to think
through writing. Let pedagogues teach what they know -about
schools, adolescents, and instruction. Then let a few, brilliant
English teachers teach how to teach English to adolescents."
However it is to be achieved, the proper preparation of
schoolteachers . demands the collaboration of these estranged
professoriates. Carl J. Dolce, dean of the School of Education at
North Carolina State University and a CBE director, makes the
point in a recent position paper: "Academically inept teachers are
graduates of colleges and universities, and not just of teacher
education programs ... Teacher quality failures are really failures
of an entire institution."
It is the universities' responsibility to foster collaboration; and as
long as certification is a function of state authority, the states must
make sure that universities and colleges meet that responsibility.
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